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I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of index funds, which automatically track an index of 
stocks, continues to grow in the United States and, albeit less intensely, in 
the European Union (EU).1  “Investors have embraced the new model of
low-cost, passive investing and [continue to turn] away from high-cost 
active funds.”2 Due to the high concentration of the index funds industry, the 
exponential rise of mutual funds designed to track stock indices has had 
significant corporate governance implications.3 Specifically, passive
investing significantly impacts listed companies’ ownership on both sides of
the Atlantic. The three leading passive fund managers—BlackRock, Vanguard, 
and State Street—make up an increasingly important component of the
shareholder base of listed companies, as they hold relevant stakes—usually 
not exceeding 5%—in thousands of American and European companies.4 
Therefore, they are able to play a crucial role in shareholders’ meetings 
and to exert considerable influence over the board and management.
Although it is widely acknowledged that the rise of passive investing is
beneficial for final investors—“who benefit from greater diversification and
lower costs”5—many institutions and corporate governance experts
contend the “ETF-ization”6 of listed company ownership has negative
corporate governance implications because passive investors are deemed
to be also passive owners, who are not interested in being actively involved 
in the corporate governance of investee companies.7 
There is no doubt that institutional investors’ corporate governance
passivity, or rational reticence, is nothing new. As Ronald Gilson and 
Jeffrey Gordon note, institutional investors are “rationally reticent,” as
they respond to proposals by other investors, but are unlikely themselves
 1.  See infra Part II.
2.  Timothy Strauts, 5 Charts on U.S. Fund Flows that Show the Shift to Passive 
Investing, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.morningstar.com/blog/2018/03/ 
12/fund-flows-charts.html [https://perma.cc/JPC5-Q5PK].
 3.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional 
Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 100–01 (2017); Jill Fisch et al., Passive Investors 1, 14, 
16, 19 (Univ. of Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 414/2018). 
 4.  See infra Part II.
5.  Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L.
493, 494 (2018); see also Frank Partnoy, Are Index Funds Evil?, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2017, at 24,
24. 
6.  Peter Smith, The ETF-isation of the S&P 500 Sparks Lively Debate, FIN. TIMES 
(July 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2d81240c-626c-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895 
(referencing the report, The ETF-ization of the S&P 500, Part 1, from Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch). 
 7.  See infra Part III. 
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to make them.8 Although the rational reticence of institutional investors 
may be attributable to a variety of factors, the fundamental problem is that 
they are not adequately incentivized to engage actively with investee
companies.9 The costs incurred in relation to engagement reduce returns 
and can result in a loss of clients to competitors offering higher returns.
Furthermore, there is an acute free riding problem: the costs incurred by 
an institutional investor to engage with an investee company also benefit 
the other institutional investors in the same company.10 
The dissemination of passive investing seems to exacerbate the rational
reticence of institutional investors. Even though index funds are, by
definition, focused on the long term—they are designed to automatically
track a market index and are unable to sell the shares included in the 
tracked index—index fund managers are deemed to have even more limited 
incentives to engage with investee companies than with other institutional 
investors.11 For passive funds, the potential downsides of engagement are 
greater than they are for actively managed funds because, in the passive
fund industry, the free rider problem is even more significant.12 As passive
funds automatically track an index, for example S&P 500, the potential
benefits resulting from corporate governance intervention are very limited— 
given the huge number of portfolio companies—and inevitably create an
advantage for all competitors tracking the same index.13 Consequently,
passive institutional investors tend to invest limited resources in engaging
with investee companies.14 In addition, although they vote in almost all 
8.  Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 
895 (2013). 
 9.  See Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 364, 371–74 (Jeffrey Gordon
& Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
10. See id. at 373. 
11. See F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: The Case for Significant 
Shareholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 24,
2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-significant-
shareholder-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/A6SQ-A5K6] (“[W]e are permanent shareholders. 
To borrow a phrase from Warren Buffet: Our favorite holding period is forever. We’re
going to hold your stock when you hit your quarterly earnings target. And we’ll hold it 
when you don’t.  We’re going to hold your stock if we like you. And if we don’t. We’re 
going to hold your stock when everyone else is piling in. And when everyone else is 
running for the exits. . . . That is precisely why we care so much about good governance.”). 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
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shareholder meetings of the investee companies and have a high number 
of engagements, leading passive fund managers often use a one-size-fits-
all approach, which does not analyze the specific problems relating to
individual companies.15 Therefore, the rise of passive investing seems to 
clash with the aim—pursued by many lawmakers and regulators—of 
promoting more active involvement by institutional investors in the  
corporate governance of their investee companies and of calling for a
reconsideration of the role of institutional investors in the governance of 
listed companies. 
This proves to be particularly apparent within the EU corporate governance
framework where “[e]ffective, sustainable shareholder engagement is one 
of the cornerstones of listed companies’ corporate governance model, 
which depends inter alia on checks and balances between the different
organs and different stakeholders,”16 and institutional shareholders are 
asked to “play an important role in the corporate governance of those
companies, but also more generally with regard to their strategy and long-
term performance.”17 
Nevertheless, the EU Commission contends that institutional investors
focus mainly on the short-term horizon and seek short-term profits18 and,
consequently, puts companies under pressure and pushes them to adopt
short-term oriented strategies.19 Therefore, corporate governance initiatives
at European and EU Member State levels seek to incentivize institutional 
investors and asset managers to shift their focus to the medium and long-
term and to stimulate their engagement to promote review of investee
companies by institutional investors.20 At the EU level, the SHRD, as 
modified by the SHRD II, sets out specific requirements to encourage
15.  See infra Part III. 
16. Eur. Comm’n, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance – 
a Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, at
8, COM (2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012). 
17. Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 
2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of  Long-Term  
Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 1, 3 [hereinafter SHRD II]. 
18. Id. at 1; see also Therese Strand, Short-Termism in the European Union, 22
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 15, 23–25 (2015). 
19. See Rock, supra note 9, at 363 (“[C]apital markets often exert pressure on
companies to perform in the short term, which may jeopardize the long-term financial and 
nonfinancial performance of companies and may, among other negative consequences, 
lead to a suboptimal level of investments, for example in research and development, to the 
detriment of the long-term performance of both the companies and the investors.” (citing
SHRD II, supra note 17, at 3)); see also Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe: 
A Critical Review of the European Commission’s Initiatives on Corporate Law and 
Corporate Governance, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 139, 173 (2015). 
20. See SHRD II, supra note 17, at 5, 16.
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long-term oriented shareholder engagement.21 In addition, Directive
2013/50/EU—amending the Transparency Directive—removed the duty
to prepare quarterly financial reports, which have been blamed as one of 
the drivers of the short term focus of investors and companies.22 What is
more, over the last few years, many Member States have taken steps to 
incentivize long-term investment by institutional investors, such as the 
introduction of time-phased voting in France and Italy.23  This legislation 
has also been complemented by soft law measures. In particular, stewardship 
codes drawn up by institutions and sectoral associations at the national 
level, according to the leading example of the EFAMA Stewardship Code, 
seek to promote ongoing interaction between institutional investors and
investee companies to protect value over the long-term.24 
However, the conceptual background to such initiatives is not entirely
convincing. First, a large body of scholarship denies that short-termism
is a major problem for modern corporations.25  A large number of studies 
demonstrate that, in recent years, there has not been any significant reduction 
in the investment timeframe for institutional investors.26 Empirical evidence 
also shows that short-termism is not necessarily bad and does not necessarily
21. See generally Directive 2007/36, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 July 2007 on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies,
2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 [hereinafter SHRD].
22. See generally Directive 2013/50, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to
Information about Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market,
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus to 
be Published when Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and
Commission Directive 2007/14/EC Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Implementation
of Certain Provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 13, 19.
23. See Hopt, supra note 19, at 173–74; Marco Ventoruzzo, The Disappearing 
Taboo of Multiple Voting Shares: Regulatory Responses to the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat 
1, 8–9 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 288/2015, 2015), http://www. 
ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id2574236.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5C7J-8S88].
24. EUROPEAN FUND & ASSET MGMT. ASS’N, EFAMA STEWARDSHIP CODE 6–7 (2018), 
http://www.efama.org/search/pages/results.aspx/results.aspx?sq=1&k=Code%20For%20
External%20Governance [https://perma.cc/WHL3-KUWY].
25. See Strand, supra note 18, at 23–29. 
26. See generally Anne M. Tucker, The Long and the Short: Portfolio Turnover 
Ratios & Mutual Fund Investment Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. 581 (2018) (showing that 
mutual fund investment time horizons, as measured by portfolio turnover ratios, did not
decline between 2005–2015). 
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affect long-term investments and performance.27 In addition, the EU
Commission’s institutional investor-driven strategy is subject to a further 
limit. It considers institutional investors in unitary terms and does not 
take sufficient account of the fact that they have different investment
styles.28  Because index funds are unable to sell shares included in the
tracked index and, consequently, are long-term shareholders, regulatory
strategies aimed at curbing short-termism are completely ineffective in 
turning passive investors into active owners.29 By contrast, the rise of
passive investing shows that, to this end, reducing the engagement-related
costs is key.30 
Against this background, although the corporate governance consequences 
of passive investing have already gained much attention—albeit still limited 
on the part of legal scholarship—in the United States and around the 
world, this Article attempts to consider the lessons that can be learned 
from the EU Corporate governance approach, which largely relies on the 
active role of institutional investors.31 The objective is to develop a new
policy framework that can not only effectively promote a more active 
corporate governance role for passive investors but also can be easily
transplanted into various countries, including the United States, when 
considering alternatives to hedge fund-driven activism.
To achieve this aim, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes
passive investing and its vertiginous rise in the United States. It also
provides an overview of the factors that can lead to further expansion of 
passive funds in the EU. Part III presents a survey of empirical and anecdotal
evidence concerning the corporate governance consequences of passive 
27. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 
124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1554 (2015) (“Favoring the interests of long-term shareholders could
thus reduce, rather than increase, the value generated by a firm over time.”); Mark J. Roe,
Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977,
978 (2013) (“[S]ystem-wide short-termism in public firms is something to watch for 
carefully, but not something that today should affect corporate lawmaking.”). But see 
generally Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 
37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012) (proposing structural changes to counter short-termism). See 
also Mariassunta Giannetti & Xiaoyun Yu, Adapting to Radical Change: The Benefits of
Short-Horizon Investors 27 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 467/2016, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2723357 [https://perma.cc/8ZC4-QYNG] (“[I]n the
aftermath of permanent negative shocks that alter a firm’s economic environment and 
require changes in business strategy, the managers of firms with more short-horizon investors
do not enjoy the quiet life and adapt to the new business environment better than other
similarly affected firms.”). 
28. Marina B. Madsen, Promoting the ‘Right’ Kind of Ownership: The Good, the 
Bad and the Passive, 29 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 143, 149–50 (2018). 
29. See infra Section V.C.
30. See infra Part IV. 
31. See SHRD II, supra note 17, at 3. 
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investing. Part IV evaluates whether the current EU Commission corporate
governance approach and, in particular, the disclosure duties set out by
the SHRD II, are capable of turning passive investors into active owners.
In doing so, Part IV also contends the main obstacle to active institutional 
investors’ involvement in the governance of investee companies is not
short-termism but rather the costs of engagement. Part V develops a conceptual 
framework of potential regulatory strategies aimed at stimulating more 
active involvement by passive investors by favoring a reduction in engagement- 
related costs. Part VI sets out concluding remarks.
II. THE RISE OF PASSIVE INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EU 
Passive index funds include index mutual funds and exchange traded
funds (ETFs).32 Although index mutual funds and ETFs are technically
different—index funds are traded only once a day after markets have 
closed and ETFs can be bought and sold continuously during the entire 
trading day33—they share the fundamental characteristic of seeking to
replicate stock indices and to minimize cost ratios.34 Therefore, as passive
funds attract investors on the basis of their ability to track an index and do
not seek outperformance as active investors do, their investing “decisions 
are largely automated” and do not imply a specific analysis to pick new 
shares.35 Consequently, passive funds can charge much lower fees than 
active funds.36 
32. Hereinafter, passive index funds, passive funds, and index funds are used  as  
synonyms.  When a distinction between these definitions is relevant, it will be specified.
33. Benjamin Braun, From Performativity to Political Economy: Index Investing, 
ETFs and Asset Manager Capitalism, 21 NEW POL. ECON. 257, 266 (2016). 
34. Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-
Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 
299 (2017); see also EDWIN J. ELTON ET AL., PASSIVE MUTUAL FUNDS AND ETFS:
PERFORMANCE AND COMPARISON 3–6 (2018). Index mutual funds and ETFs can be
considered substitutes, but “not perfect substitutes.” Anna Agapova, Conventional Mutual 
Index Funds Versus Exchange Traded Funds, 14 J. FIN. MKT. 323, 224 (2011).
35. Lund, supra note 5, at 506, 511. 
36. See also  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ASSET MANAGEMENT MARKET STUDY FINAL 
REPORT 5 (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/market-studies/ms15-2-3.pdf [https://
perma.cc/97A3-58ZX] (“[M]any active funds offer similar exposure to passive funds, but 
some charge significantly more for this. We estimate that there is around £109bn in
‘active’ funds that closely mirror the market which are significantly more expensive than 
passive funds.”). 
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Over the last few years, such a favorable cost structure and the incapacity 
of a large proportion of active managed funds to beat the market indices 
has led to an exponential rise in passive investing in the United States.37 
To cite some particularly meaningful data regarding only equity funds,
index funds hold a market share of 43% in the United States.38  At the end
of 2015, passive index funds in the United States had about $4 trillion in 
assets under management, exceeding the assets under management of the 
entire hedge fund industry.39 Moreover, over the past ten years the share
of total U.S. market capitalization held by passive index “funds has
quadrupled to more than 8%, or 12% of the S&P 500.”40 Additionally, 
growth in passive index funds is likely to continue into the future.  In fact,
in January 2018, assets held globally by passive index funds passed the 
$5 trillion mark for the first time; experts expect that it will soon reach the 
$10 trillion mark41 and even outpace active fund assets in the United States 
by 2024.42 
Despite its continuous growth, the passive index fund industry remains 
highly concentrated. The market is dominated by Blackrock, Vanguard 
and State Street Global Advisors (State Street)—the “Big Three”—which, 
overall, manage over 90% of all assets under management in passive 
37. See Itzhak Ben-David et al., Exchange-Traded Funds, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 
169, 175 (2017); Fichtner et al., supra note 34, at 302–03; see also Jeff Bukhari, Stock-
Picking Fund Managers Are Even Worse Than We Thought at Beating the Market, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/13/stock-indexes-beat-mutual-funds/ 
[https://perma.cc/32KH-ULJB] (“The S&P 500 outperformed more than 92% of large-cap
funds over the last 15 years. Mid- and small-cap funds fared no better over the time period, 
with their benchmarks besting them 95.4% and 93.2% of the time, respectively. Overall,
82.2% of all active funds were outperformed over the 15-year period.”); Attracta Mooney,
European Active Managers Beaten by Passives, 10-Year Study Finds, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
30, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c6183f2f-f58a-3569-a6ac-9d2b44adfe28 (“Most
active fund managers survived and beat their average passive peers in just two of the 49
fund categories, according to an analysis by Morningstar, the data provider, covering June 
2008 to June 2018.”). 
38. HORTENSE BIOY ET AL., MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE FUND PROVIDERS TAKE AN ACTIVE 
APPROACH TO INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 8 (2017), http://www.morningstar.com/content/ 
dam/morningstar-corporate/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-Passive-Active-Stewardship.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VA89-4CYP].
39. Id. at 6–8. 
40. Lund, supra note 5, at 507 (citing Ian Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive
Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 111 (2016)). 
41. Chris Flood, ETF Market Smashes Through $5tn Barrier After Record Month, 
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/5cf7237e-0cdc-11e8-839d-41ca 
06376bf2. 
42. See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by
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equity funds.43  Such a high concentration of the passive index fund industry
has contributed to the re-concentration of listed company ownership in the 
United States. For example, Blackrock has a 5% stake in at least 2,000 
out of about 3,900 listed companies in the United States.; similarly, Vanguard 
has 1,900 5% blockholdings.44 The 5% blockholdings of Blackrock and
Vanguard are much more numerous than those of the world’s largest actively
managed fund group, Fidelity Investments, which holds about 700 5%  
holdings in the United States.45 Considering the size of their equity interests, 
the Big Three together represent the largest shareholder in most U.S. listed
companies; in particular, they own nearly 90% of public companies in the
S&P 500 and at least 40% of all U.S. listed companies.46 
Passive index funds have also experienced significant growth in Europe, 
albeit not comparable to U.S. growth. At the end of 2017, passive index 
funds accounted for 16% of total assets under management, although the 
figure ten years ago was 7%.47 The different growth rate for passive index 
funds in the United States and in the EU may be dependent upon the
different client base. Although in the United States the growth of passive
investing has been pushed by both institutional and retail investors, in the
EU prevalently institutional investors have invested in passive funds.48 
Nevertheless, the EU has also experienced significant growth in the  
43. Fichtner et al., supra note 34, at 304. 
44. Id. at 311–12. 
45. Id. at 312–13. 
46. Id. at 313 (“[L]arge companies where the Big Three are not the main shareholders
are typically dominated by private individuals [including:] Berkshire Hathaway (Warren
Buffett) [and] Amazon.com (Jeff Bezos) . . . .”); Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership 
Concentration and Corporate Conduct, 10 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 413, 416–17 (2018). 
47. BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 6. 
48. Id. (“Fund distribution networks in Europe are dominated by large commercial 
banks that have shown little interest in the commercialization of low-cost investments to 
retail investors. Besides, up until now, European financial advisors had never been 
incentivized to promote funds such as ETFs that do not pay retrocession fees.”); see also
Philip Stafford, The Differences Between US and European ETF Markets, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 
7, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/aa4e3be2-baff-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080. Moreover,
the prevalence of institutional investors among clients of passive funds is consistent with the 
general trend in the European asset management industry, where pension funds, insurance 
companies, and other institutional investors are by far the most important clients. See












   
    
      
  
    
  






     





   
 
 
   
   
 
      
 
  
   
   
  
  
   
     
  
   
  
market share of passive funds over the last few years.49 In 2017, “[n]et 
inflows into European-listed ETFs reached a record $108 [billion].”50 
This favorable trend is expected to be bolstered by recent regulatory
changes affecting EU financial markets—including the implementation of 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)—which
introduces some changes in the law that could favor the dissemination of
passive index funds and specifically ETFs.51 First, MiFID II leads to an 
increased transparency of ETF trading.52 Because ETF trades in Europe
mainly occurred in private bilateral over-the-counter transactions, most 
ETF trades were unreported.53  The MiFID II radically changes this scenario 
by subjecting trades in ETFs to a post-trade reporting requirement.54 
Therefore, experts believe the visibility of trading volumes will enable 
investors to better understand the true level of trading and liquidity and, 
consequently, attract more investor inflows into ETFs.55 Second, to strengthen
investor protection and to increase clarity for clients regarding the service 
they receive, the MiFID II restricts the ability for firms providing independent 
investment advice and portfolio management services to accept and retain 
fees, commissions, or any monetary and nonmonetary benefits from issuers 
or product providers.56 Such a restriction on commissions “is expected to 
create a level-playing field for the distribution of passive funds to European
retail investors” by stimulating financial advisors to promote passive index 
funds more intensively.57 
Nevertheless, although their market share in the EU has been hitherto 
much more limited than in the United States, passive index funds have 
already had a significant impact on the corporate governance of many
European investee companies. For instance, Blackrock is currently “the 
largest shareholder of a third of FTSE 100 companies as well as a top-5
shareholder of 89 of them [and] the largest shareholder in around one-
49. BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 6. 
50. Chris Flood, Mifid Tips Balance Against Active Funds in Favour of ETFs, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/07f1d252-0061-11e8-9e12-af73e8db3c71.
See Directive 2014/65, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2
51. 
014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 349 [hereinafter MiFID II].
52. See id. at 401. 
53. Flood, supra note 50.
54. See MiFID II, supra note 51, at 401–02. 
55. See Flood, supra note 50. 
56. See MiFID II, supra note 51, 405–08. 
57. BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 6–7. But see Pauline Skypala, EU Rule Changes 
Deliver Mixed Results So Far, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
46641e26-93f2-11e8-95f8-8640db9060a7 (“[C]hange will come slowly in Europe as retail
investors there are mainly served by banks rather than independent financial advisers.”).
812
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third of DAX-30 companies.”58  The position is similar for French and
Italian listed companies. An analysis recently issued by Euronext shows 
that, at the end of 2016, Blackrock and Vanguard were, respectively, the 
fourth and fifth largest shareholders in the CAC 40 and that passive funds 
accounted for more than 5% of shareholdings in twenty-nine CAC 40
companies.59 Along the same lines, in Italy, Blackrock and Vanguard are
respectively the first and third largest foreign investors on the Milan Stock 
Exchange in terms of the size of their holdings.60 BlackRock has holdings
in excess of 2% in twenty-five out of the forty companies included in the 
FTSE MIB index.61 
Therefore, even though their growth has been more restrained in the EU
than in the United States, passive index funds are already a force to be
reckoned with for European lawmakers, regulators, and corporate governance 
experts. As shown below,62 the growth in long term oriented investors, who
adopt a passive investment style, calls for a reconsideration of the EU 
Commission’s strategy, which is largely reliant on the role of institutional 
investors and seeks to turn them into active stewards of investee companies. 
58. See Schmalz, supra note 46, at 15–16. 
59. See generally EURONEXT, WHO ARE THE CAC 40 SHAREHOLDERS? (2018),
http://www.agefi.fr/sites/agefi.fr/files/fichiers/2018/01/euronext_cac_40_study_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PFB7-RJS5].
60. Andrea Franceschi, Da Blackrock a Norges Bank, ecco chi sono i più importanti 
investitori esteri a Piazza Affari [From BlackRock to Norges Bank, Here Are the Most





62. See infra Parts IV, V.
813
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III. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF PASSIVE
INVESTING: FROM SHORT-TERMISM TO PERMANENT 
SHAREHOLDERS
A. The Passive Investors’ Cost-Driven Approach to 
Voting and Engagement
Because of its significant growth, numerous studies have examined 
passive investing from various perspectives.63 The legal literature has
until now mainly focused on potential anticompetitive effects that can
arise when—as frequently occurs—leading passive investors, meaning 
generally the Big Three, own large shareholdings in competing 
companies.64 Over the last few years, scholars have also been considering 
63. Lund, supra note 5, at 496. See generally Henry T. C. Hu & John D. Morley,
A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-Traded Funds, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839 (2018)
(showing the need for a regulatory framework for ETFs). 
64. Compare Einer Elhauge,  Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267,
1267 (2016) (“A small group of institutions has acquired large shareholdings in horizontal 
competitors throughout our economy, causing them to compete less vigorously with each
other.”), and Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and 
Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2027–28 (2018) (“[T]o the extent the empirical 
evidence warrants the conclusion that large scale horizontal acquisitions threaten reduces 
product output and higher prices, the existing tools of antitrust merger enforcement are 
sufficient to support challenges to those acquisitions.”), and Eric A. Posner et al., A 
Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J.
669, 669–700 (2016) (“Antitrust scholars have long understood that when one owner . . .
acquires large stakes in two or more competitors, it will have an incentive to induce those 
competitors to compete less. Recent empirical evidence shows that this type of concentration 
is . . . leading to higher prices.”), with Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, The Case
for Doing Nothing About Institutional Investors’ Common Ownership of Small Stakes in 
Competing Firms 2–3 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research. Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 2018-21, 2018) (“The prevailing view among the antitrust elite . . . 
seems to be (1) that common holdings by institutional investors significantly diminish
competition in oligopolistic industries, and (2) that additional antitrust intervention is 
appropriate to prevent competitive harm. We are skeptical of this two-pronged view.”),
and Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional 
Investor Involvement in Corporate Governance 1–2 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-05, 2017) (“[E]ven if there were substantial antitrust
risk, the primary effect of [proposals for dramatic changes in enforcement policy] would 
be to drive institutional investors back towards their traditional passivity in corporate 
governance . . . .”).  See also Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era
of Corporate Compliance 54 (June 12, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (“[C]ommon ownership has the potential to enhance institutional investor’s incentives
to improve their awareness of macro legal risks—risks of criminal investigations and 
criminal and civil proceedings that are common to entire industries such as healthcare
(pharmaceuticals), finance and energy—and to respond appropriately. It also demonstrates how 
common ownership is likely to improve the ability of institutional investors to recognize new
trends and patterns by having privileged access to rulemaking and by creating a network
of companies that have similar legal exposure and that allow experimental learning.”).
814
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the impact of passive investing, especially of ETFs on market efficiency.  
In particular, the rise of passive investing is deemed to pose a threat to
price discovery and to lead to an increased procyclicality of markets.65 
Recently, legal and financial scholars have started to shed light on the 
corporate governance implications of passive investing;66 however, this
stream of research is in the initial stages.67 
As far as the corporate governance implications of passive investing are 
concerned, the fundamental question is whether passive investors are also
passive owners, or whether they can play an active role in the corporate
governance of investee companies. On the one hand, as passive index 
funds seek to replicate stock indices and to minimize cost ratios, they do
not have financial incentives to intervene in the corporate governance of
their portfolio companies.68 Because the indices replicated by index funds
include hundreds of companies, the potential benefits deriving from 
corporate governance intervention are likely to have a very limited impact
on the funds’ overall performance.69 In addition, index fund managers are 
affected by a structural collective action problem because, as Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Hirst note, “a move by any given index fund manager to 
improve stewardship and raise fees would unravel, because its investors 
would prefer to free-ride on the investment manager’s efforts by switching
to another investment fund that offers the same indexed portfolio but
without stewardship or higher fees.”70 Therefore, according to this line of 
thought, passive investing strategies exacerbate the collective action problems 
facing institutional investors, with the sole exception of hedge funds.71 
65. See STEVEN D. BLEIBERG ET AL., THE IMPACT OF PASSIVE INVESTING ON MARKET 
EFFICIENCY 7 (2017), https://bpmmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/The_Impact_of_ 
Passive_Investing_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/36SJ-9MZB]; Ben-David et al., supra 
note 37, at 178–85; Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The Implications of Passive
Investing for Securities Markets, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV., Mar. 2018, at 113,
119–26; Itzhak Ben-David et al., Do ETFs Increase Volatility? 43 (Fisher Coll. of Bus. 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2011-03-20, 2017). 
66. See, e.g., BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 3; Lund, supra note 5, at 527–28. 
67. See Nan Qin & Di Wang, Are Passive Investors a Challenge to Corporate
Governance? 2 (Mar. 24, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[T]he
potential impact of passive investors on corporate governance is an important but largely 
unexplored topic.”). 
68. Lund, supra note 5, at 500. 
69. See id.
70. Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 98. 
71. See infra text accompanying notes 133–33. But see Fisch et al., supra note 3, 
at 1, 10–13 (“While the conventional view focuses on the competition between passive 
815
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What is more, the ability of passive investors to effectively oversee investee
companies is considered limited because they do not have the ability to 
influence mangers by threatening to withdraw from the company.72 
On the other hand, however, there are several reasons why passive index
funds could play an active role in the governance of investee companies.73 
First, because passive investors are, by definition, permanent shareholders, 
they should naturally be incentivized to monitor managers to improve the 
company’s performance.74 Second, because the Big Three “are simply 
too-big-to-be-passive,”75 there is growing reputational and regulatory pressure 
for leading passive index fund managers to play an active monitoring role.76 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)77 and the EU Commission adopted a disclosure-based regulatory
funds tracking the same index, our analysis suggests that passive funds also compete
against active funds. Passive fund sponsors therefore have an incentive to take measures 
to neutralize the comparative advantage enjoyed by active funds, that is, their ability to
use their investment discretion to generate alpha. Because they cannot compete by exiting
underperforming companies, passive investors must compete by using ‘voice’ to prevent 
asset outflow.”).
72. See Appel et al., supra note 40, at 113–14. 
73. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 15–16. 
74. See Appel et al., supra note 40, at 113–14; see also BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, 
at 3; Qin & Wang, supra note 67, at 3; Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate
Law 39 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 402/2018, 2018),
http://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalgoshenhannes.
pdf [https://perma.cc/KXH3-CX55].
75. Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: 
A Network Theory Perspective 14 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
393/2018, 2018), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/final 
enriquesromano.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4KR-8GCH].
76. See BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 3 (“[F]acing mounting pressure from a variety
of stakeholders, asset managers have little choice but to increase their level of engagement
with the companies they invest in and better demonstrate their commitment to driving 
change for the better to a diverse group of stakeholders around the globe.”); Fisch et al.,
supra note 3, at 31 (“[F]iduciary duties partially explain why mutual funds, including
passive investors exercise voice. Fiduciary duties also direct funds to exercise that voice 
in a manner that is intended to increase the value of the fund and its portfolio companies.”).
77. In the United States, voting by mutual and public pension funds was fueled by
regulatory action taken to enhance the fiduciary obligations applicable to voting proxies.  
First, by two companion SEC releases of 2003 addressing voting disclosures for registered
management investment companies and registered investment advisers exercising voting 
authority over fund portfolios. Rock, supra note 9, at 376–78 (first citing Proxy Voting 
by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6586 (Feb. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
275); and then citing Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by
Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7,  2003) (to be  
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274)).  Second, by Department of Labor interpretative 
guidelines concerning the legal standards imposed by §§ 402, 403, and 404 of Title I of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016–01 
(20178) (articulating a general principle that a fiduciary’s obligation to manage plan assets
prudently extends to proxy voting). Those rulings were largely misinterpreted as requiring 
816
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strategy that prompted—albeit without imposing a duty—institutional 
investors to extensively vote on all portfolio shares.78 In addition, it is
addressees to vote on all matters, that is to vote every proxy. See Rock, supra note 9, at 
376–78; Lund, supra note 5, at 526–28. Further, SEC material explicitly recognized that 
votes based upon the recommendations of an independent third party can serve investment
advisers to fulfill their fiduciary obligations under Rule 206(4)-6 and was further 
interpreted as requesting investment advisers to vote on all matters. See Douglas Scheidt,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No-Action Letter to Kent S. Hughes, Egan-Jones Proxy
Servs., on Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(May 27, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/egan052704.htm
[https://perma.cc/W94C-7VRC]; Douglas Scheidt, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Letter to 
Mari-Anne Pisarri, Institutional S’holder Servs., on the Investment Advisors Act of 1940
– Rule 206(4)-6, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 15, 2004), https://www.
sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/iss091504.htm [https://perma.cc/JAX9-56AF]. To 
tackle these unintended consequences, in 2014, the SEC Divisions of Corporate Finance 
and Investment Management released new guidance regarding the responsibilities of investment 
advisers concerning proxy voting. See Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment
Advisers and Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory Firms: 
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF), U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 30, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/V2DH-C6VD]. Similarly,
the Department of Labor revised its guidance in 2008 and 2016. See Interpretative Bulletin 
Relating to Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,732 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (clarifying that proxies should be voted as part of
the process of managing the plan’s investment in company stock unless a responsible plan
fiduciary determined that the time and costs associated with voting proxies with respect to 
certain types of proposals or issuers may not be in the plan’s best interest, and further
stating that it is appropriate for a plan fiduciary to incur reasonable expenses in fulfilling
those fiduciary obligations). Interpretive Bulletin 2008-2 was later withdrawn and replaced by
Interpretive Bulletin 2016-1, which reinstates the language of Interpretive Bulletin 94-2
with certain modifications—illustrating that a discrete analysis of the cost of the shareholder 
activity versus the economic benefit associated with the outcome  of the activity is  not  
needed in any case but only under special circumstances, hence clarifying the conditions 
under which voting and engaging in areas, such as ESG, that are increasingly being
internationally recognized as important to long-term shareholder value are compatible
with a plan’s fiduciary obligations not to sacrifice investment return or take on additional 
investment risk as a means of using plan investments to promote collateral social policy 
goals. Interpretative Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written 
Statements of Investment Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,879 (Dec. 29, 2016) (to be codified at 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2509).
78. Similar to the United States, a duty to vote every share is not mandated under 
European law, although investment managers are still not allowed to remain passive and 
choose not to vote their shares because—depending on the investment strategies adopted
—this might be in conflict with their duty to manage investments in the best interest of 
their clients. See, e.g., Christian Strenger & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate Governance, 
Cross-Border Voting and the (Draft) Principles of the European Securities Law Legislation — 
Enhancing Investor Engagement Through Standardisation, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 503, 512– 
15 (2013) (“[A] conduct where institutional investors remain passive as a rule, and only 
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credible that creating the appearance of governance expertise will help 
passive funds managers win over clients, especially among institutional 
investors.79 
The conduct of the Big Three appears to confirm this last viewpoint.
They frequently reiterate that they participate in the governance of investee 
companies. For example, in his letter to the CEOs of the world’s largest 
companies in January 2018, Larry Fink, the CEO of Blackrock states that,
in managing its index funds, 
BlackRock cannot express its disapproval by selling the company’s securities as
long as that company remains in the relevant index. As a result, our responsibility 
to engage and vote is more important than ever. In this sense, index investors are 
the ultimate long-term investors—providing patient capital for companies to 
grow and prosper.80 
Furthermore, the Big Three have established stewardship teams, which 
are responsible for voting at investee companies’ annual general meetings 
and for conducting engagement initiatives.81 Nevertheless, available data 
and empirical evidence on the impact of passive investing on corporate 
governance are mixed and do not definitively support either of the two
opposing views mentioned above.82 
engage exceptionally, imposes a liability risk on these investors. This is because these
requirements, in addition to referencing systemic issues, rely on the presumption that 
shareholder voting preserves, or even increases, the long-term value of the investment. . . .
[T]his incentive structure in favour of voting [is] an implicit duty  to vote.”).  It  is also  
interesting to note that the Danish Stewardship Code has stated that a passive index-based
investment does not automatically exempt the institutional shareholders from engaging in
active ownership. COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, STEWARDSHIP CODE 3 (2016), https:// 
corporategovernance.dk/sites/default/files/180116_stewardship_code.pdf [https://perma.cc/
95MB-2S72].
79. Lund, supra note 5, at 527 (“[I]f the institution is perceived as being an involved
and engaged steward, that will help funds attract assets and clients, especially from pension 
funds (a large and growing passive fund client) or other groups that view governance as a 
priority.”).
80. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, 
BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter 
[https://perma.cc/LZ2A-XRQT]. For similar remarks from  Vanguard’s CEO, see McNabb,
supra note 11. 
81. See Rock, supra note 9, at 368–69; Fichtner et al., supra note 34, at 308. 
82. Two factors make measuring the impact of passive investing difficult. First, 
“[c]orrelations between passive investors and governance choices might not reflect a
causal relation since ownership by passive investors might be correlated with factors— 
such as firms’ investment opportunities or ownership by active investors—that directly 
affect managerial decisions.” Appel et al., supra note 40, at 113. Second, the Big Three
tend to prefer “behind the scenes” engagement, which has an impact that is, by nature,
more difficult to identify. Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2911, 2922–26 (2016);
see also Fichtner et al., supra note 34, at 318.
818
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Although engagement and voting statistics provided periodically by the
Big Three show that they vote extensively at the shareholder meeting of
investee companies,83 the analysis of the Big Three’s voting patterns
raises doubts as to the capacity of the Big Three to perform an active 
stewardship role over investee companies and, indeed, their interest in 
doing so. In fact, statistics suggest that in most cases they vote in favor 
of the management proposal,84 although the number of dissenting votes
has been increasing slightly.85 Moreover, the data parallel the still limited 
empirical studies, which show passive investors often vote the same way
and as a rule vote to approve the proposals made by the management.86
Consequently, there is widespread belief among corporate governance 
experts that to keep their fees low passive index funds should adhere to a 
low-cost box-ticking approach to voting.87
83. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT: 2017 VOTING AND
ENGAGEMENT REPORT 4–5 (2017), https://www.BlackRock.com/corporate/literature/
publication/blk-2017-annual-voting-and-engagment-statistics-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
A63X-PDLH]; VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 28–33
(2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/annual-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
VH29-RMU6]. See generally STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, 2017 VOTE SUMMERY REPORT
(2017), https://www.ssga.com/about-us/asset-stewardship.html [http://perma.cc/97D3-
EHZ5] (showing the voting statistics for all State Street Global Advisors accounts). 
84. For example, all of the Big Three have backed the management in more than
90% of votes. Fichtner et al., supra note 34, at 317–18 (noting that the Big Three usually 
support management against activist shareholders’ proposals and that more than half of
the Big Three votes against management concern directors’ re-elections); see also BLACKROCK,
supra note 83, at 4 (“Our starting position is generally to support management. . . . if we
believe the issue under consideration is clearly not in our clients’ economic interests [and]
the company does not wish to engage with us or engagement fails to resolve our concerns.”);
BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 13 (noting that BlackRock and Vanguard tend to vote in 
favor of management more often than other firms). 
85.  See, e.g., VANGUARD, supra note 83, at 28–33.  Interestingly, the percentage of
voting against is higher in the EU than in the United States in relation to certain issues—
such as the adoption of anti-takeover measures like poison pills and thresholds for approval. 
See BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 13 (“[Asset managers in Europe tend to report higher . . . 
percentages of ‘Against’ votes than their U.S. counterparts.”); BLACKROCK, supra note 83, 
at 5.
86. See Davidson Heath et al., Passive Investors are Passive Monitors 17–20 (Nov.
18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
819
=3259433 [https://perma.cc/R6F5-7FDU].  This finding is not uncontested.  For example, 
some contend “greater ownership by passive funds is associated with less support for 
management proposal.” Appel et al., supra note 40, at 127. However, they do not provide 
evidence showing most passive index funds votes are against managers. See generally id.
87. See Lund, supra note 5, at 495 (noting passive investors tend to approve any
shareholder proposal that meets pre-determined qualifications); see also Rana Foroohar, 
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For sure, given the considerable number of portfolio companies, the
stewardship teams at the Big Three are not capable of dedicating the same
attention to all portfolio companies or preparing corporate governance 
reports for each.88 In fact, although they are expanding,89 the investment
stewardship teams at the Big Three are clearly too small. For example, 
Blackrock’s team is made up of around thirty people who have the task of
monitoring corporate governance issues of around 17,000 companies and
of voting in around 17,000 shareholder meetings each year.90  So, as has
been noted by Edward Rock, Big Three stewardship teams “[s]imply voting
the shares, without even considering how to vote them, is an enormous task.”91 
This means that Big Three stewardship teams draw up nearly identical voting
guidelines, which they normally tend to follow fairly closely.92  For instance,
in 2015,
Investors Pass the Buck on Governance, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.
ft.com/content/f2510d5a-b961-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589; Attracta Mooney & Robin 
Wigglesworth, Passive Fund Managers Face Showdown in US Gun Debate, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/517fbbb6-1d4c-11e8-956a-43db76e69936. 
88. See Lund, supra note 5, at 516. But see Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 27 (“[G]iven
the fact that passive funds do not focus on individual firm-specific characteristics, the size
of their governance staffs offers substantial manpower to analyze governance issues. By
way of comparison, the total number of employees at many hedge funds, which engage in 
significantly greater firm-specific research, is not dramatically higher than full-time 
governance staff at the major passive investors.” (citing Madison Marriage, BlackRock, 
Vanguard, and State Street Bulk Up Governance Staff, Fin. Times (Jan. 28, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a)). 
89. BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 19. For instance, in 2018 Vanguard created a
new European stewardship team that is expected to include at least five members. Chris 
Flood, Vanguard Creates New European Stewardship Team, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/5dbd7d56-1256-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277. 
90. BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: PROTECTING OUR CLIENTS’ ASSETS
FOR THE LONG-TERM 5, 13, 17 (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/ 
publication/blk-profile-of-blackrock-investment-stewardship-team-work.pdf [http://perma.cc/
NQM8-673L]. For an in-depth analysis of how the stewardship teams of the Big Three
function see Rock, supra note 9, at 368–71; see also Mooney & Wigglesworth, supra note 
87 (showing the Big Three’s stewardship teams in numbers); Lund, supra note 5, at 515– 
16 (noting that the Big Three’s stewardship teams are devoted to governance issues at 
thousands of companies). 
91. Rock, supra note 9, at 370 (emphasis omitted); see also Bebchuk et al., supra
note 3, at 100 (“[E]ach of these major investment managers devotes less than one person-
workday per year, on average, to assessing this and other information, and undertaking 
other stewardship activities with respect to each of their portfolio companies.”); Asaf 
Eckstein, Great Expectations: The Peril of an Expectations Gap in Proxy Advisory Firm 
Regulation, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 93 n.118 (2015) (“Michelle Edkins, Managing Director
and Global Head of Investment Stewardship at BlackRock, Inc., remarked, ‘We are all
under time pressure, huge time pressure.  There are days when we are voting 25, 30 meetings 
across our team.’” (citation omitted)).
92. See, e.g.,Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/
investment-stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/# [https://perma.cc/2D42-LCYP] (“[T]he
820
POST STRAMPELLI PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2018 9:35 AM        
 
     
  
    
       
     
       
 
   
  
 
   
  
   
   
   
 
          
  
       
  
    
    
  
            
    
     
    
          
         
   
    
      
 
    
    
    
     
 
   
    
        
        
   
     
     
[VOL. 55:  803, 2018] Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
[a]t BlackRock, in 18 per 100,000 of the proposals one of their funds did not vote 
along with the other funds, and for Vanguard this is even more consistent with
only 6 per 100,000 of the proposals receiving mixed votes. State Street also
show[ed] a low level of internal disagreement, 195 per 100,000, though somewhat
higher than BlackRock and Vanguard.93 
In addition, these voting patterns may be a consequence of the fact that
the Big Three rely largely on proxy advisory firms’ services—mainly those 
of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis94—which, in 
turn, adopt standardized voting policies.95 
Nevertheless, perhaps because of the growing reputational and regulatory 
pressure for asset managers to provide strong corporate oversight,96 some
passive fund managers insistently state that they adopt a more nuanced 
approach to voting and do not automatically adhere to proxy advisors’ 
recommendations.97 In particular, BlackRock states that although it votes
guidelines adopted by the Board provide a rigorous framework for assessing each proposal. 
Under the guidelines, each proposal must be evaluated on its merits, based on the particular 
facts and circumstances as presented.”); see also  STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, ANNUAL
STEWARDSHIP REPORT 2017 YEAR END 12 (2018), https://www.ssga.com/investment-
topics/environmental-social-governance/2018/07/annual-stewardship-report-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DT23-ZSP8] (declaring that State Street adheres strictly to adopted voting 
policy and all its voting and engagement activities are centralized within the asset stewardship 
team irrespective of investment strategy or geographic region).
93. Fichtner et al., supra note 34, at 317 (noting that, by contrast, Fidelity—the
world’s largest actively managed fund group—shows “internal disagreement in 3,144 per
100,000 votes”); see also Lund, supra note 5, at 517 (“Th[e] higher degree of 
inconsistency [shown by active fund managers] is likely due to the fact that institutions 
with a greater share of active investments, like Fidelity, tend to give active fund managers
freedom to cast the fund’s votes, and different fund managers will reasonably reach
different conclusions for controversial proposals or have varying perspectives based on 
the differing needs of their investors. And it indicates that the centralized voting strategy
utilized by passive funds may not be in the best interests of all investors.” (footnotes 
omitted)).
94. BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 14.
95. See Gaia Balp, Regulating Proxy Advisors Through Transparency: Pros and 
Cons of the EU Approach, 14 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017). 
96. See supra note 77–78 and accompanying text; see also BIOY ET AL., supra note
38, at 3.
97. See Enriques & Romano, supra note 75, at 15 (“[I]t would be politically 
unacceptable for [the largest institutional investors] to have their humongous voting power 
de facto exercised by an external advisor with no direct or indirect stake in the company.”).
As regards Vanguard, evidence consistent with this prediction are provided by Stephen
Choi and his colleagues. See Stephen Choi et al., Who Calls the Shots?: How Mutual
Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 56–59 (2013); see also Ed
Batts, BlackRock Talks . . . and U.S. Companies Must Listen, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
821




   
  
  
    
   
 






    
           
 
     
  
     
 
 
   
   





       
   
   




    
     
  
     
   
    
  
on routine matters based on voting policy guidelines,98 a detailed in-house 
review is carried out whenever specific problems arise.99 Moreover,  
BlackRock notes that it does “not follow any single proxy advisor’s voting 
recommendations, and in most markets . . . subscribes to two research
providers.”100  Proxy advisors are just one of many tools that BlackRock
uses to make its voting decisions.101 Therefore, based on this flexible approach, 
index and active funds managed by BlackRock can cast votes differently 
where they may have a different perspective concerning any given issue.102 
Consequently, even though the available data show they “follow a ‘check 
the box’ approach” in most cases—which does not consider the specific
needs of each portfolio company103—an analysis of their voting patterns
does not suffice to conclude that the Big Three are also passive owners.104 
In fact, rather than by voting against, they prefer to influence managers 
through private engagement with them.105 Such a “hidden power”106 of
leading passive fund managers seems to be consistent with further analysis
showing that, where a passive index fund holds a large ownership stake, this
hidden power is associated with some significant corporate governance 
improvements.107 In particular, Ian Appel, Todd Gormley, and Donald Keim,
found passive index fund influence supported greater board independence, 
favored the removal of takeover defenses—restrictions on the shareholders’ 
ability to call a special meeting or classified board—and promoted more 
equal voting rights by opposing dual class share structures.108 
However, the data collected by other scholars points to a slightly more 
nuanced view. Nan Qin and Di Wang note that the growth in passive 
ownership may lower the quality of governance within investee companies
by reducing the independence of the board of directors and increasing the
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 13, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/13/ 
blackrock-talks-and-u-s-companies-must-listen [https://perma.cc/QS6E-5WFY].
98. BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 26 (reporting that BlackRock directs routine votes 
to ISS, which votes in line with the instructions outlined in BlackRock’s policy).
99. BLACKROCK, supra note 83, 13–14. 
100. Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted).
101. See id. at 13–15. 
102. Id. at 13. 
103. Appel et al., supra note 40, at 134. 
104. See Fichtner et al., supra note 34, at 306–07. 
105. See supra note 83; see also Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 25–27. 
106. Fichtner et al., supra note 34, at 298, 323. 
107. See Appel et al., supra note 40, at 127–28 (contending large passive investors
“use their ownership stake and ability to vote to” influence companies’ corporate governance). 
108.  Id. at 123–34 (pointing out that their findings do not address the further question 
whether passive investors look at the governance needs of each single company or, instead, 
follow pre-defined voting policy). 
822
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likelihood of CEO-chair duality.109 Along the same lines, Cornelius Schmidt
and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach show that, in companies where passive index
funds have large shareholdings, the power of CEOs increases—demonstrated
by the fact that they more frequently become chairman or president—and
independent director turnover decreases, with such directors serving longer 
terms.110 In addition, and perhaps more interestingly, Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 
find that a greater proportion of passive investors in the shareholder base 
is associated with more value-destroying mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
activities.111 Therefore, this outcome seems to be consistent with the
hypothesis that passive investors are less likely to monitor managers.112 
As Schmidt and Fahlenbrach note, this evidence does not necessarily 
imply passive investors are also entirely passive owners and is also not 
inconsistent with the apparently diverging findings mentioned above.113 
In fact, the overall body of available data and evidence seems to suggest
passive index funds can have a positive impact on corporate governance 
issues for which low-cost interventions are required, such as voting according 
to pre-defined policies at annual meetings.114 By contrast, passive investors
are deemed to be generally passive owners “when it comes to high-cost 
governance activities such as monitoring of M&A, the choice of board
members, or the accumulation of titles that often happen outside of annual 
general meetings and require continuous monitoring.”115 Moreover, this
109. Qin & Wang, supra note 67, at 25–26 (“[H]igher ownership by passive investors is
related to lower firm value measured by Tobin’s Q and weaker operating performance
measured by return on assets. . . . [P]assive investors exacerbate the managerial myopia 
problem by discouraging corporate long-term investment measured by R&D and capital
expenditure.”). 
110.  Cornelius Schmidt & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Do Exogenous Changes in Passive 
Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value?, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 
285, 293–94 (2017). 
111. Id. at 298–300. 
112. Id. at 299–300.  But see Ahmed Baig et al., Passive Ownership and Earnings 
Manipulation 6 (Feb. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[D]emonstrating
that passive ownership affects firms in a positive way by reducing their susceptibility to
committing financial statement fraud.”).
113. Schmidt & Fahlenbrach, supra note 110, at 287, 300. 
114. This is in line with the view that “the Big Three enjoy substantial economies of 
scale with respect to corporate governance and market-wide initiatives.” Fisch et al., supra 
note 3, at 13, 17 (“Passive investors own the entire market and therefore also enjoy
economies of scale in evaluating governance provisions, because the same governance 
provisions are likely to be in play at multiple companies within the passive fund’s portfolio.”). 
115. Schmidt & Fahlenbrach, supra note 110, at 287 (emphasis omitted); see also
Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 15 (“Because of the large size of their portfolios and their
823





    
 
 











   
    
  
   
 
   
     
 
       
  
   
        
 
  
   
  
       
    
 
     
    
      
 
 
    
  
  
view is backed by anecdotal evidence that shows the Big Three mainly
focus on topics—corporate governance, board composition, climate risk
disclosure—that require low-cost interventions, normally by voting at the
shareholders’ meeting.116 
Although the available evidence is still limited and insufficient to draw 
a final conclusion, the engagement practices of the Big Three seem to be 
generally consistent with this view.  In keeping with their frequent assertions
that their engagement is an essential element of their investment stewardship
programs,117 the Big Three engage with hundreds of investee companies.  
For instance, in 2016, BlackRock disclosed 1,480 engagements, Vanguard 
817, and State Street 611.118 The number of engagements by the Big Three
is high considering other significant, albeit smaller, passive fund managers 
reported a limited number of engagements. For example, Deutsche Asset
Management, which has 15% of its asset under management invested in 
passive funds, reported only thirty-seven engagements in 2016.119 
However, these numbers do not tell the whole story. First, although the 
figure is high in absolute terms, the number of engagements reported by
the Big Three is limited when compared to the number of their portfolio 
companies. For example, if BlackRock invests in around 17,000 companies, 
no engagement activity is carried out for around 14,800 of these.120 
Second, although meetings between investee companies and institutional
investors that invest mainly in active funds are conducted mainly by 
investment analysts—for whom corporate governance engagement is merely
limited firm-specific knowledge, passive investors are poorly-positioned to identify the
firm-specific operational qualities that would enable them to prompt individual companies 
to outperform.”).
116. For example, BlackRock’s engagement priorities for 2017-2018 include 
governance, corporate strategy, compensations, climate risk disclosure, and human capital.
Abe M. Friedman & Robert McCormick, BlackRock’s 2017-2018 Engagement 
Priorities, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/17/BlackRocks-2017-2018-engagement-priorities/
[https://perma.cc/5AP9-S5T9]. Similarly, Vanguard indicates four stewardship pillars: 
board, corporate governance structure, compensation, and risk.  VANGUARD, supra note 83, at
5; see also Eckstein, supra note 64, at 30–33; Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 19. 
117. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: GLOBAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE & ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 3 (2017), https://www.BlackRock.com/corporate/ 
literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-1engprinciples-global-122011.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P7VN-ZBP6] (“BlackRock views engagement as an important activity; engagement
provides BlackRock with the opportunity to improve our understanding of investee companies 
and their governance structures, so that our voting decisions may be better informed.”); 
Chris Wightman, Engaging with Vanguard, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/08/engaging-with-
vanguard/ [https://perma.cc/BP39-J8G7].
118. BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 16.
119.  Id.
120. See Lund, supra note 5, at 519. 
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a complementary aspect of their work—in firms where passive funds 
predominate engagement initiatives are conducted by investment stewardship 
teams that cannot always count on the cooperation of and exchange of 
information with investment teams and portfolio managers.121 
For example, at Vanguard, active funds use external advisors to manage 
investments.122 Therefore, although the stewardship team at Vanguarduses input from its subadvisors for its voting and engagement activities, it
does not seem to be able to leverage their expertise as effectively as stewardship 
teams at other firms that have in-house research and investment teams.123 
Moreover, although passive funds may free ride on information from active 
funds when the same institution—for example, BlackRock, has its assets
invested in both active and passive funds124—this free-riding opportunity
is likely limited as active funds invest in far fewer companies than passively 
managed funds.  In addition, because of the continuous outflow of resources
from actively managed funds, investment institutions are likely to reduce 
the workforce dedicated to investment analysis.125 
Third, also because of the observation made above, Big Three stewardship 
teams rarely engage with companies concerning business related strategies, 
as this would give rise to significant costs, thereby increasing the fee 
charged by passive index funds.126 This would appear confirmed by the
indications provided in the stewardship policies and reports of the Big
Three, which demonstrate that their engagement efforts are mainly concentrated 
on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) matters; with regard to
business-related issues—such as M&A—they tend to vote according to  
their voting policies and in the vast majority of cases in favor of the 
management.127 More notably, at BlackRock, from July 1, 2016 to June
121. See  BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 16 (“[I]n firms where active management 
dominates . . . the portfolio managers and ESG analysts primarily drive the engagement 
process.”); see also Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 22. 
122. See BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 46. 
123. See id. at 16. 
124. See STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, supra note 92, at 10 (“[State Street]’s corporate 
stewardship team works closely with [its] active fundamental investment teams, collaborating
on issuer engagements and sharing input on company-specific fundamentals.”); see also
Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 18. 
125. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 3. 
126.  See Schmidt & Fahlenbrach, supra note 110, at 300; see also Eckstein, supra
note 64, at 30 (“Incentives of institutional investors to monitor their portfolio companies
depend on the relative costs and benefits of monitoring.”); Partnoy, supra note 5.
127. See BLACKROCK, supra note 83, at 3; STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, supra note 
92, at 27 (reporting that, in 2016, only 3% of engagements related to merger and acquisitions);
825











     
   









       
   
  
   
 
      
    
  
   
  
   
     
    
  
       
     
    
   
  
   
30, 2017, most engagements were qualified as “basic” and generally amounted 
to one single conversation concerning a routine matter.128 By contrast, 
only 147 of 1,274 engagements qualified as “extensive” engagements—
technically complex, high-profile, and involving numerous meetings over 
a longer timeframe.129 
B. Indirect Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing: 
The Impact on Activism 
According to Gilson and Gordon’s definition, institutional investors are
“rationally reticent,” as they are willing to respond to governance proposals 
but are unwilling to advance them and use their voting power unless they
are stimulated by activist shareholders.130 The rise of passive investing is
destined to increase the tendency of institutional investors to be rationally
reticent. The continuous flow of invested assets from actively managed 
funds to passive index funds may induce active fund managers to adopt a 
low cost investment strategy—to reduce the costs associated with engagement 
with investee companies—thereby containing fees and avoiding outflow 
of clients.131 This evolution confirms institutional investors have a limited 
incentive to play an active governance role, and hedge funds should act as 
“catalysts” in facilitating shareholder action.132 
By contrast, because of their performance-related fee structure, activist
hedge fund managers have stronger incentives to invest in stewardship: 
they are able to capture a significant share of the value increase generated
by governance-related campaigns.133 In addition, “for activist hedge funds,
activism is ex ante and strategic.”134 In fact, “[a]ctivists first identify 
a problematic company, then decide whether intervention can improve
matters. If activists conclude that an intervention is warranted, they buy
VANGUARD, supra note 83, at 28–33 (reporting that, in 2017, it sided with the management
in almost all the proposals concerning merger and acquisitions—100% in the United States
and 97% in the EU). 
128. BLACKROCK, supra note 83, at 3. 
129. Id.
130. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 8, at 888–902. 
131.  See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund Investors Get What 
They Pay For? Securities Law and Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 31, 31, 45– 
46 (2016) (“A purportedly active fund with a portfolio that substantially overlaps with the
market or any indexed market segment is known as a closet index fund.”). 
132. Rock, supra note 9, at 382; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 104–07; 
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 8, at 896–97. See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
1021 (2007); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991). 
133. Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 104–06. 
134. Rock, supra note 9, at 382 (citing Kahan & Rock, supra note 132, at 1069). 
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a stake in order to intervene.”135 However, because hedge funds usually
hold a minority stake, which is not sufficient to prevail within investee
company shareholder meetings, they must seek the support of nonactivist 
institutional investors in order to impose their strategy.136 Because the Big
Three, taken together, hold large shareholdings in many listed companies and
their votes are often decisive within contested director elections and
management proposals,137 interaction between activist hedge funds and
passive investors takes on a major importance.138 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether passive fund managers have 
any interest in supporting campaigns by activist hedge funds. As has recently 
been outlined by Dorothy Lund, various arguments appear to suggest passive
index funds are unlikely to support activists’ initiatives.139 First, because
the potential beneficial effects of activist intervention will not improve the 
passive fund’s relative performance, they are unlikely to bear the costs of
evaluating—and possibly supporting—an activist campaign.140 Moreover,
passive fund managers might refrain from supporting an activist to avoid
“jeopardiz[ing their] relationship with the target company and put[ting]
the fund at risk of losing corporate pension fund assets.”141 In addition,
based on the growing body of scholarship that claims that Big Three horizontal 
investing across competing firms has anticompetitive effects, passive fund 
managers have no incentive to back activist campaigns because their success
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also Alessio M. Pacces, Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of 
Hedge Funds Activism in Corporate Governance, 4 ERASMUS L. REV. 199, 208 (2016); 
Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 18. 
137. See supra Part II.
138. See Simi Kedia et al., Institutional Investors and Hedge Fund Activism 31 (Nov. 
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2018&paper_id=342 [https://perma.cc/4Q7Z-
7ET8]; Alessio M. Pacces, Hedge Fund Activism and the Revision of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive 14–16 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 353/2017, 
2017), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/3532017.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3PT6-9K36].
139. Lund, supra note 5, at 520–21. 
140. Id. at 520 (“First, because passive funds lack information about the company
and its performance, they would need to invest time and resources to evaluate the activist’s 
proposal. Second, supporting an activist would cause the fund to incur the costs of 
interfacing with management and potentially participating in litigation.” (citing Robert C.
Pozen, The Role of Institutional Investors in Curbing Corporate Short-Termism, 71 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 81, 83 (2015)). 
141. Id.
827





     
     
    
  
   
  
 
     
  





     
   
  
       
   
 
  
   
     
     
       
       
      
    
      




       




   
 
 
could lead to the adoption of more aggressive strategies that could harm 
other companies included in the passive funds’ portfolios.142 
This prediction proves to be consistent with the limited empirical 
analysis concerning voting by passive funds within proxy contests.  Alon 
Brav, Wei Jiang, and Tao Lishow “passively-managed funds are significantly
less likely than active funds to vote for dissidents” and, more generally, that
“the most pro-dissident fund families typically have a low [proportion] of 
passive funds.”143 Specifically, “the number of passive funds within the
family” is correlated both with their participation in a proxy contest and
with their “support for management.”144  Therefore, Big Three passive
funds are likely to influence voting by active funds managed by the same 
institution. In addition, Brav and his colleagues found that the level of passive 
fund investment in the firm targeted by activists correlates negatively with 
support for the dissident.145 This is consistent with the hypothesis “that
passive funds with significant investment in target firms, often belonging
to large families that also manage the targets’ retirement assets, are less
likely to challenge the management because of potential conflicts.”146 
Nonetheless, especially over the last few years, the interplay between 
passive index funds and activist hedge funds has been undergoing significant 
changes.147 Although in most cases passive investors continue to side with 
management, the Big Three have been displaying signs of greater openness 
towards activist investors. First, within proxy contests, the Big Three support 
activists in a significant number of cases.148 Notably, BlackRock “voted
142. Id. at 521. 
143. Alon Brav et al., Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How Mutual 
Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 3 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 18-16, 2018). 
144. Id. at 19 (“[T]he most pro-dissident families tend to have few passively managed 
funds, and vice versa.”). 
145. Id. at app. at 8. Brav and his colleague’s conclusions are consistent with Appel 
and his colleague’s analysis excluding the existence of a positive correlation between
ownership by passive funds and the likelihood of a firm experiencing hedge fund activism 
event or a takeover; indeed, the holding of a larger ownership stake by passive funds has 
been found to be associated with a decline in hedge fund activism. Appel et al., supra note 
40, at 128. 
146. Brav et. al, supra note 143, at app. at 8; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, 
at 103; Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 34. 
147. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 24 (“Passive investors both benefit from 
activists and mediate their influence.”).
148. See Brav et al., supra note 143, at 19, 49 (“The support rate for dissidents ranges
from 16.8% by Vanguard to 34.8% by BlackRock.”); see also LAZARD, 2017 ACTIVISM
YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/450414/lazards-review-of-
shareholder-activism-q4-2017pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA39-27HH]; Sahil Mahtani,
Telecom Italia Vote Shows How Activists and Passive Investors Can Work Together, CLS 
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in favor of the activist Nelson Peltz . . . in his proxy fight with Procter &
Gamble [and also] in favor of Bill Ackman against ADP.”149 At Exxon’s
May 31, 2017 annual general meeting, the support of BlackRock and
Vanguard proved decisive in approving the shareholder proposal seeking 
the enhanced disclosure of climate-related risks.150 
Therefore, the interplay between passive fund managers and activist 
investors is becoming increasingly important. On the one hand, passive
investors are paying increasing attention to activists’ campaigns. For example, 
Vanguard reported that “[p]roxy contests and contentious transactions were 
a prominent issue in [2016] and were discussed at 16% of [its] engagements.”151 
Along the same lines, BlackRock defines its engagement approach as  
follows: it engages with the activist investor if it believes doing so would 
provide a better understanding of their proposals, and when activists are 
seeking board seats it “usually meet[s] with the nominees in advance of 
the shareholder meeting to understand what they believe they would bring 
to the board.”152 
On the other hand, although “a relatively pro-activist shareholder base 
is a key factor driving activists’ selection of targets”153 and, therefore, it
is likely that they will prefer to target companies where the presence of 
passive investors is less marked, activists are increasingly willing to seek 
the support of passive investors, which frequently turns out to be the key 
for the success of the activist campaigns.154 Consequently, activist investors
appear to be ever more inclined to “tailor their interventions to satisfy”
passive investors,155 as shown by their increasing tendency “to appeal to the
149. Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk
Losing Our Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FHQonI.
150. Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against ExxonMobil 
Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholder-
rebellion-over-climate-change/?utm_term=.dbcc54736ca4 [https://perma.cc/KZU6-VA2H]. 
151. VANGUARD, supra note 83, at 24.
152. BLACKROCK, supra note 83, at 14; see also Wightman, supra note 117 (explaning 
that Vanguard adopts an identical approach).
153. See Brav et al., supra note 143, at 1. 
154. See Ethan A. Klingsberg & Elizabeth Bieber, Activism in 2018, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2018/01/29/activism-in-2018 [http://perma.cc/GPX2-9GSR]. 
155. Lund, supra note 5, at 522; see also Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 24–25 (“Passive
funds have a potentially critical role in screening activism because their incentives may
differ from those of the activists. Passive investors share in company-wide gains from 
valuable activism, but they lose if the activist can implement changes that produce short 
829






        




          
      
 
  
   
  
   
    
 
  
    
 
           
      
    
    
    
     
   
 
       
  
 
   
      
 
   
  
     
   
    
  
   
      
       
   
longer-term and often structural and governance-oriented concerns of the 
passive strategy fund shareholders.”156 
The impact of passive investing upon activist investors’ strategic choices 
and goals has been investigated in a recent study by Appel and his colleagues,
which was the first to address the issue.157 This study shows the rise of 
passive investors—associated with more frequent activist campaigns entailing 
confrontational and costlier tactics, which are often aimed at gaining 
board seats—and a corresponding decrease in other types of campaigns 
including those seeking to improve shareholder value by demanding policy
changes such as increased dividends.158 In addition, higher passive ownership 
is correlated with a higher number of proxy fights and a sizeable increase in 
the likelihood of a proxy settlement with management, which often results in
the activist obtaining board representation.159 
These findings still appear too limited to draw definitive conclusions and
can be interpreted in different and somewhat contrasting ways.  On the
one hand, frequent use of aggressive tactics by activists may negatively 
impact corporate value by shortening the company’s investment horizon.160 
However, some anecdotal evidence show the rise of passive investing could
refocus activists to adopt strategies that are more oriented to the long-term 
and that more broadly consider a company’s social responsibility-related 
issues.161 Thus, although the findings mentioned above could be a consequence
term gains but destroy the company for the long term, because passive investors, unlike 
active investors, cannot exit before that happens. These incentives are likely to make 
passive investors take a more cautious approach and be less willing than actively-managed
funds to support some activists.” (footnote omitted)); McNabb, supra note 11 (“The nature
of activist investing has changed significantly since the 1980s.  Today, we’re seeing a  
greater trend toward constructive activists rather than destructive activists. Activists
are not inherently good or bad.  They often raise legitimate questions.  When activists
raise legitimate questions and tie their business cases to long-term shareholder value, that 
gets our attention.”). 
156. Klingsberg & Bieber, supra note 154; see also LAZARD, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM –1Q 2018, at 1 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/450655/lazards-review-
of-shareholder-activism-1h-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGV7-632H].
157. See generally Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of
Passive Investors on Activism (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
22707, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22707.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9YM-5X42].
158. Id. at 18–25; see also LAZARD, supra note 156, at 9–10. 
159. Appel et al., supra note 157, at 18–22. 
160. For the diffused criticism concerning the activists’ short-term perspective, see
generally John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge 
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016); Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological 
Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014). 
161. For example, in 2017 the well-known activist hedge fund, JANA Partners—
usually focused on improvement through mergers and acquisitions or operational improvements 
at target companies—allied with public pension fund California State Teachers’ Retirement
830
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of the fact that it is less expensive to organize a campaign within companies 
where ownership is more concentrated,162 available evidence underscores
the hypothesis that activists tend to prefer tactics aimed at pursuing long-
term and governance-related objectives in line with the preference of 
passive investors.163 Therefore, contrary to what might have been predicted
at first glance, passive investing could limit widespread concerns on short-
termism on the part of activist hedge funds.164 
IV. RECONSIDERING THE APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
ENGAGEMENT IN THE ERA OF PASSIVE INVESTING:
THE KEY PROBLEM IS ONE OF COSTS,
NOT SHORT-TERMISM
Passive index funds are necessary long-term investors because they
cannot see the shares included in the index they are tracking.165  Thus,
they vote extensively at the shareholder meetings of investee companies 
System to urge Apple to take actions aimed at curbing growing addiction among children
to Apple’s devices. Robert G. Eccles, Why an Activist Hedge Fund Cares Whether Apple’s 
Devices Are Bad for Kids, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/why-
an-activist-hedge-fund-cares-whether-apples-devices-are-bad-for-kids [https://perma.cc/ 
FFD2-BTP5] (“[A]ctivists are actually no strangers to seeking returns from genuine, long-
term value creation.”); see also Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business
Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 696–701 (2016); Lindsay
Fortado, Investing: Activism Enters the Mainstream, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018), https:// 
www.ft.com/content/e04547b8-0d0b-11e8-839d-41ca06376bf2 (“[M]any [hedge funds] 
stress that they are holding positions for longer and not clamouring for share buybacks or
quick sales, but rather urging changes they claim will help the company long-term.”); 
Owen Walker, Hedge Funds Boost ‘Responsible Investment’ Strategies, FIN. TIMES (May
26, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/5cb7bcd4-5f5c-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04 (reporting
that activists are ever more inclined to integrate ESG factors into their campaigns). 
162. See Appel et al., supra note 157, at 20–21. 
163. See id. at 29; see also Christopher P. Skroupa, Passive Investors and Their Role 
in Activism For 2018, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2017, 11:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
christopherskroupa/2017/12/20/passive-investors-and-their-role-in-activism-for-2018/3/ 
#18f4bf066f12 [https://perma.cc/B8GV-AY73] (“As both activists and the companies they
look at have sought greater influence amongst passive funds, a ‘passive-centric’ mindset has
developed in the marketplace.”). 
164. See Appel et al., supra note 157, at 29 ( “[P]assive investors have been shown 
to be strong supporters of good governance practices that are consistent with long-term
firm value . . . and we provide evidence here that passive institutional ownership also 
bolsters the efforts of activists that seek see similar goals.”). 
165. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 4; Joshua Kennon, Investing in Index Funds for 
Beginners (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/investing-in-index-funds-for-beginners- 
356318 [https://perma.cc/9AHR-YUB5]. 
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and engage with a significant number of them—albeit on a limited scale
in proportion with the overall number of portfolio companies.166  Moreover,
passive index funds, including the Big Three, pay close attention to ESG 
issues with the aim of driving and sustaining the long-term growth of 
investee companies in the interest of their clients.167 Indeed, the rise of 
passive investing has been associated with a rise in responsible investing, 
as is shown, for example, by the ever increasing number of signatories to 
the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI).168 Leading passive index 
fund managers repeatedly reassert their commitment to stimulating investee 
companies to take responsibility for their impact on society to “benefit all 
of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and 
the communities in which they operate.”169 
Thus, the rise of passive investing seems to represent an evolution in 
the investment industry, which is perfectly in line with the objectives of 
the EU Commission’s corporate governance strategy because passive 
investors—perhaps, surprisingly—feature characteristics of active owners 
that are considered “the ‘right’ kind of ownership” at the EU level.170 In
fact, in the 2011 Green Paper, the EU Commission clearly stated that an
active, long-term oriented shareholder should “actively monitor[] portfolio 
companies, engage[] in dialogue with the company’s board, and [exercise] 
shareholder rights.”171 Along the same lines, the SHRD II also emphasizes
the importance of effective and sustainable shareholder engagement and 
highlights that “[g]reater involvement of shareholders in corporate governance 
is one of the levers that can help improve the financial and nonfinancial
performance of companies, including as regards environmental, social and 
governance factors.”172 Consequently, some of the criticisms leveled against
the disclosure-based initiatives set out by the SHRD II to promote engagement 
by institutional shareholders could be reconsidered from a different
perspective in the light of the rise of passive investing. 
In particular, the EU Commission’s assumption that the increased 
disclosure of institutional investors’ investment and engagement strategies
could “facilitate the dialogue between companies and their shareholders,
166. See BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 3, 23. 
167. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 80. 
168. See BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 9–10. 
169. Fink, supra note 80. 
170. Madsen, supra note 28, at 145–50; see also Fisch et  al.,  supra note 3, at 38 
(“[F]or those concerned with the short-termism that may accompany greater monitoring
by active mutual funds and hedge funds, passive investors with a significant ownership
stake serve as a valuable antidote.”).
171. Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework, at 11, COM (2011)
164 final (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter EC Green Paper].
172. SHRD II, supra note 17, at 3.
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encourage shareholder engagement and strengthen their accountability to 
stakeholders and to civil society” is criticized.173  Critics of the EU Commission’s
approach assert, in the first place, that increased transparency yields limited 
effects because it does not create financial incentives or lower the costs of
engagement.174 Second, the disclosure of engagement policies and activities 
could negatively impact institutional investors’ “willingness to engage in 
this type of activism”175 because they may prefer “behind the scenes 
engagement.”176 In addition, because according the SHRD II, Article 3c,
disclosure of an engagement policy is optional on a “comply or explain-
basis,”177 such a disclosure-based strategy is considered too flexible to
induce institutional investors to engage actively with investee companies.
However, within a context where leading passive index fund managers 
focus on long-term value creation and ESG issues—for example in annual 
letters from their CEOs178—the disclosure of the engagement policy could
place further pressure on other institutional investors and push them to
engage more actively with the investee company.179 As noted above, the
available evidence shows the capacity of passive investors to influence
activist hedge funds’ strategies by re-orienting them towards a longer term
strategy.180 What is more, the continuous advance of passive investors
who heavily focus on ESG issues could induce the managers of actively 
managed mutual funds to commit to responsible investing and to incorporating 
ESG issues into the investment process. The fact that paying greater
attention to ESG issues is capable of attracting a certain type of client— 
pension funds—attributes significance to these issues and responds to the 
criticism that institutional investors are excessively focused on the short
173. Id.
174. See Hanne Søndergaard Birkmose, European Challenges for Institutional
Investor Engagement – Is Mandatory Disclosure the Way Forward, 11 EUR. CHARTER
FUNDAMENTAL RTS. 214, 236 (2014); Hopt, supra note 19, at 177; see also Rock supra
note 9, at 379–81. 
175. Strand, supra note 18, at 38. 
176. McCahery et al., supra note 82. 
177. Hopt, supra note 19, at 153, 177. 
178. See, e.g., F. WILLIAM MCNABB III, VANGUARD, AN OPEN LETTER TO DIRECTORS
OF PUBLIC COMPANIES WORLDWIDE 2 (2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-
stewardship/governance-letter-to-companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQJ6-7B7N]; Fink, supra
note 80. 
179. See Lund, supra note 5, at 528 (“[T]he market could view the decision to not 
vote as a signal of poor quality, especially when all other funds continue to highlight their 
governance abilities.”). 
180. See supra text accompanying note 163. 
833
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term.181 This virtuous cycle can prove even stronger in the EU where pension 
funds, insurance companies, and other institutional investors are by far the 
most important clients for the European asset management industry.182 
Moreover, this positive effect would not be limited by the fact that  
engagement policy disclosure is adopted on a “comply or explain” basis.183 
The requirement to illustrate the reasons that led to a deviation from best 
standards represents a significant incentive to comply with disclosure 
obligations, considering the reputational consequences of noncompliance.184 
Thus, the disclosure of the engagement policy according to the SHRD II,
Article 3c, can alleviate, at least in part, the effects of collective action 
along with the free-rider problem inducing institutional investors to abstain
from engagement. Presumptively, then, “reputational competition” within 
the investment industry is a factor that can induce most institutional investors 
to increase their efforts in engagement with investee companies and to bear
the related costs.185 In other words, reputational incentives can induce 
institutional investors to incur the engagement-related costs that they
could save by free-riding on other investors’ engagement.186 
Therefore, the rise of passive investing may favor the achievement of 
the EU Commission’s objectives in the area of listed company corporate 
governance: greater involvement of institutional investors in the corporate 
181. See Lund, supra note 5, at 527–28 (“The fact that the Big Three increasingly 
tout their governance expertise in their marketing materials, in speeches, and in op-eds
indicates that they believe that creating an appearance of governance expertise will help
them win clients.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)); Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 13
(“[F]und sponsors may see governance engagement as a branding or marketing tool that 
provides them with another dimension on which to compete for assets.”). 
182. See EUR. FUND & ASSET MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 48, at 29–33. 
183. David Hicks, Corporate Governance: One Size Does Not Fit All, QUOTED
COMPANIES ALLIANCE (May 24, 2018), https://www.theqca.com/information-centre/corporate- 
governance/150331/corporate-governance-one-size-does-not-fitall.thtml [https://perma.cc/
H2C2-SE9E]. 
184. See Madsen, supra note 28, at 153–54. 
185. See BIOY ET AL., supra note 38, at 20 (“All in all, it is fair to say that most index
managers have no intention to free-ride with respect to engagement.  All but one of the
surveyed firms have plans to intensify their efforts in this area and bear the associated 
costs. This is because they see engagement as an important and integral part of their
stewardship responsibilities and increasingly as something that clients expect from—in the
words of one surveyed manager—a ‘grown-up’ asset-management organization.”).
186. For example, Fidelity International, a small institutional investor—not to be 
confused with Fidelity Investments—recently created the new position of stewardship and
sustainable investing head. Eugenia Jimenez, Fidelity Names Head of ESG Team, INV.
EUR. 1–2 (Jan. 15, 2018), http://www.investmenteurope.net/regions/fidelity-names-head-
esg-team/ [https://perma.cc/D84Q-QT6Y]; see also Sarah Gordon, UK Fund Managers 
Commit to Increasing Social Impact Investment, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https:// 
www.ft.com/content/167c7164-2dc1-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381 (“Social impact is moving
up investors’ agenda as companies face increasing scrutiny over their behaviour towards 
all stakeholders.”).
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governance of investee companies, a shift towards long-term value creation, 
and greater attention to the nonfinancial performance of companies, which 
include environmental, social and governance factors. Accordingly, if
this is the case, there would not appear to be any need for any regulatory 
reaction by the EU Commission to the rise of passive investing.
However, such a conclusion is excessively positive and is not in line
with the evidence mentioned above, which demonstrates some of the 
drawbacks of passive investors’ voting and engagement and raises doubts 
as to whether these investors have any interest in effectively overseeing
investee company activities. In particular, because of their investment 
strategy and the related fee structure, passive investors have an interest in
keeping engagement- and voting-related costs low.  For this reason, in
many cases they vote according to predefined voting policies, without 
carrying out any analysis on the specific company.187 Second, and more 
importantly, passive investors mainly focus on ESG issues requiring low-
cost interventions although they refrain from engaging in high-cost
governance activities such as monitoring of M&A or presenting slates of
candidates for election to the board of directors.188 Consequently, given
the collective action problems facing the investment industry, active fund 
managers have no more incentive to invest in stewardship than passive 
investors do because investment does not lead to any significant improvement 
in their relative performance.189 
This appears to have a paradoxical consequence. The rise of investors
focused on long-term value creation and ESG issues called for by the EU
Commission may not result—to use the words of the Commission itself—
in an effective and exhaustive system of “checks and balances between
the different organs and different stakeholders,”190 especially in relation 
to operations such as M&A or related-party transactions that are more likely 
to impinge upon the value of the company and its long-term perspectives. 
However, this appears to demonstrate that the main disincentive for  
engagement by passive and active institutional investors is not short-
termism but cost. Although the EU Commission is aware that costs are an
187. See supra Section III.A. 
188. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 
3, at 101 (“[L]arge investment managers generally avoid submitting shareholder proposals,
nominating directors to the boards of corporations, or conducting proxy contests.”).
189. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 99. 
190. SHRD II, supra note 17, at 3.
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obstacle to engagement,191 the regulatory actions hitherto adopted at the
EU and Member State level may favor a reduction in engagement costs.  
As correctly noted by Madsen, although the SHRD, I and II, introduced 
measures with the aim of lowering the costs of engagement—including, 
inter alia, easier access to proxy voting, electronic general meetings, the
provision of information to shareholders prior to the general meeting, and
record date—the EU Commission cannot “control the ‘in-house’ costs that
institutional shareholders incur when engaging in shareholder activism.
Consequently, the effects on shareholder engagement that a further focus 
on shareholders’ cost frame could result in only seem minor.”192 
V. ACTIVATING PASSIVE INVESTORS BY REDUCING ENGAGEMENT-
RELATED COSTS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
POTENTIAL REGULATORY STRATEGIES
Therefore, a case for reconceptualizing the EU approach to institutional 
investor engagement is apparent by acknowledging that the true limit on 
more effective institutional investor engagement is cost and not the short
investments’ timescale. Against this background, building on the analysis 
of the EU corporate governance system, this Part will outline a conceptual
framework—easily transplantable into various countries, including the United 
States—for the potential regulatory strategies that may be adopted to 
incentivize passive index funds managers and, more generally, institutional
investors to play a more effective oversight role over investee companies. 
A. Setting a More Favorable Legal Environment for  
Activist Investors 
The previous analysis demonstrates that active and passive institutional
investors do not have sufficient incentives to scrutinize investee companies’
business strategies and to commit to costlier engagement. Costlier interventions, 
such as the monitoring of M&A or presenting slates of candidates for
election to the board of directors, may only be promoted by other types of 
institutional investors, particularly by hedge funds. As noted above, hedge 
fund managers have stronger incentives to invest in stewardship because— 
in contrast to active and passive mutual funds—they are able to capture a 
significant share of the value increase generated by governance-related
campaigns.193 Therefore, to promote more effective shareholder engagement,
191. EC Green Paper, supra note 171, at 11 (noting that costs are a barrier to
engagement); see also Birkmose, supra note 174, at 218, 234; Madsen, supra note 28, at 
156–57. 
192. Madsen, supra note 28, at 157. 
193. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
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the EU Commission could focus more on the role of activist hedge funds
as a catalyst for institutional shareholders. This would align with what 
already occurs in the United States, where hedge funds play a central role,194 
and would result in a convergence between the European and American
approaches to institutional shareholder engagement. 
However, the current EU legislation includes measures that could 
discourage hedge fund activism. In particular, the rules on disclosure of 
major holdings have relevant impact on hedge funds’ activity. As Alessio
Pacces noted, the applicable law on both sides of the Atlantic are not 
dissimilar: both United States and EU lawmakers have set a 5% beneficial
ownership threshold.195  However, the EU legal environment disfavors hedge
fund activism. First, according to Article Fourteen of the Transparency Directive,
the issuer must be notified within “four trading days,”196 although the 
United States provides a ten-day time window.197 Second, EU member 
states are allowed to set lower thresholds and shorter time windows.198 
“For example, the threshold is 3% in the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands, 
whereas the time window is 2 days in the UK.”199 In addition, the shareholder
identification regime set out in the SHRD II, Article 3a,200 may curb hedge 
fund activism in a similar manner to the obligations to disclose major
holdings.201  Both the disclosure of major holdings and the rules on
194.  See supra text accompanying note 132. 
195. Pacces, supra note 138, at 18. 
196. Directive 2004/109, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December
2004 on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information 
About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and amending 
Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38, 49 [hereinafter Transparency Directive]. 
197. Pacces, supra note 138, at 18 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2002)). 
198. See id.
199. Id.; see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 8, at 905; Alexandros Seretakis, Hedge
Fund Activism Coming to Europe: Lessons from the American Experience, 8 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 438, 461 (2014). For a comprehensive overview of the EU member 
states’ rules concerning the notification of major shareholding, see generally EUROPEAN
SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., PRACTICAL GUIDE: NATIONAL RULES ON NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR 
HOLDINGS UNDER THE TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE (2017), https://www.esma.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/library/practical_guide_major_holdings_notifications_under_transpare
ncy_directive.pdf [https://perma.cc/VDT3-DXPT]. 
200. See SHRD II, supra note 17, at 13–14. 
201. See Pacces, supra note 138, at 17–19. For an overview of the shareholder
identification and communication systems in EU member States, see EUROPEAN SEC. &
MKTS. AUTH., REPORT ON SHAREHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
18–41 (2017), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma31-54-435_ 
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identification can impact hedge fund activity by forcing hedge funds to 
disclose the purchase of target company stocks at an early stage.202 This
prevents hedge funds from purchasing undervalued stock of the target
when the hedge fund’s intentions are not yet known and selling them at a 
higher price if its campaign is successful.203 
Against this background, it must be asked whether the rise of passive 
investing could result in a reconsideration of these rules in a manner more 
favorable to activism by increasing the shareholding threshold and extending 
the time window for complying with disclosure duties.204  The EU Commission
should, in particular, reconsider that “[t]he benefits of tighter disclosure
rules in terms of improved market transparency and fairness must be 
weighed against the costs imposed on shareholders and companies as a
result of a reduction in the incidences of activist activities.”205 
A more favorable legal environment for activist hedge funds could
enable them, at least in part, to overcome the limits on engagement posed 
by passive index fund managers and nonactivist institutional investors,
who tend to become involved only in low-cost engagement activities.206 
In keeping with the view that considers cooperation between institutional
investors and activist hedge funds a prerequisite for enhancing the efficacy of
shareholder engagement, activist hedge funds, with the necessary means
and incentives, could promote costly engagement initiatives, such as the
scrutiny of M&A and related-party transactions or the presentation of slates 
of candidates for election to the board of directors.207 In keeping with their
rationally reticent approach, active and passive mutual fund managers would
only have to assess whether to support the activists’ interventions with their 
votes.208 
However, at least at the present time, it appears unlikely that there will 
be any change in the corporate governance strategy of the EU Commission
along these lines. The EU Commission does not consider activist hedge 
funds as the right kind of owners and has instead opted for institutional 
report_on_shareholder_identification_and_communication.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHB4-
8VPY].
202. See Pacces, supra note 138, at 17–20. 
203. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 8, at 904–12; Pacces, supra note 138, at 17– 
18; Seretakis, supra note 199, at 463–64. 
204. See Seretakis, supra note 199, at 466. 
205. Id. at 467 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and 
Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 59–60 (2012)).
206. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 106. 
207. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 8, at 867, 897 (“Activist investors specialize
in monitoring portfolio company strategy and formulating alternatives when appropriate
for presentation to the institutional investors; in turn, institutional investors specialize in 
portfolio management and in evaluating proposals presented by activist investors.”).
208. See id. at 867. 
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investor driven engagement.209 Furthermore, a relaxation of the disclosure
regime of major shareholdings is hardly feasible from a political standpoint, 
given that the EU Commission views these disclosure duties as one of the
pilasters of the financial market and investor protection system.210 
Aside from these political obstacles, one must remember that hedge 
fund-driven engagement has its potential drawbacks. First, as John Coffee 
noted, activism entails significant agency costs and several areas of
conflict of interest with those of other shareholders.211 Second, as activist
hedge funds own only a small proportion of the equity market compared
with the holdings of institutional investors, they are expected to intervene 
only in a limited number of companies.212  In particular, “[a]ctivist hedge
fund managers have incentives to spend on stewardship only when the 
governance-generated value increases likely to result are especially large.”213 
Therefore, activist hedge funds are willing to intervene only “when governance 
failures have led to substantial operating underperformance.”214 Absent 
these conditions, hedge funds do not have any incentives to intervene and 
fail to act as monitors of management. Accordingly, it is likely that hedge 
fund-driven engagement will not detect any corporate governance failure 
that does not give rise to underperformance on a scale sufficient to attract 
the attention of hedge funds. 
Moreover, there are doubts regarding the efficacy of interaction between 
hedge funds and passive index funds. Although, given the size of their 
shareholdings, the Big Three are often decisive in the success of activist
209. Pacces, supra note 138, at 17. 
210. See Transparency Directive, supra note 196, at 40 (“The public should be
informed of changes to major holdings in issuers whose shares are traded on a regulated 
market situated or operating within the Community. This information should enable investors
to acquire or dispose of shares in full knowledge of changes in the voting structure; it 
should also enhance effective control of share issuers and overall market transparency of
important capital movements.”). 
211. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, 
Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality 15–25 (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 373/2017, 2017), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/
documents/finalcoffee.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSQ4-E4RS] (mentioning different ways activists
can extract value from investee companies, including through the reimbursement of the 
expenses incurred in connection with the engagement—and the access to material— 
of nonpublic information). 
212. Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 168 (2015). 
213. Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 106. 
214. Id.
839
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campaigns,215 it is uncertain whether they perform this decisive role in an
appropriate manner.216 
First, empirical evidence shows that most forms of activist engagement
are resolved through private settlement negotiations between the activists 
and company management, which often results in activists winning board
seats.217 However, such settlements frequently do not involve leading 
passive investors, especially the Big Three, which “perceive themselves
as having been excluded by these private agreements from the role they 
deserve as ‘permanent shareholders.’”218 
Second, it is uncertain whether leading passive fund managers are 
interested in monitoring activists’ initiatives. On the one hand, given their 
interest in keeping fees low and the collective action problems affecting
them,219 it is uncertain whether passive index funds have any incentive to 
scrutinize the activist proposals adequately. On the other hand, because
they are permanent shareholders, they should have an interest in monitoring
activist interventions to prevent activists’ proposals that are not aligned 
with long-term objectives or that could destroy the company’s value.220 
Although the Big Three support activists with increasing frequency221 
and invest resources to evaluate the merit of activist intervention, the 
available anecdotal and empirical evidence concerning the conduct of the
Big Three in contested decisions is inconclusive.222 Additionally, especially
under the SHRD II, institutional investors could “support the engagement
215. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
216. See Pacces, supra note 138, at 14–16. 
217. See LAZARD, supra note 156, at 5 (showing that, in 2018, only 18 board seats 
out of 119 were won through proxy fight); see also Lucian  A. Bebchuk et  al.,  Dancing
with Activists 9–13 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 17-44, 2017); Coffee, supra
note 211, at 9–15. 
218. Coffee, supra note 211, at 14; see also Abe Friedman, Responding to Concerns 
Regarding the Protection of the Interests of Long-Term Shareholders in Activist 
Engagements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/10/17/responding-to-concerns-regarding-the-protection-
of-the-interests-of-long-term-shareholders-in-activist-engagements/ [https://perma.cc/
4XEB-GNRU]. Compare Bebchuk et al., supra note 217, at 26 (showing directors appointed 
through a settlement agreement do not receive lower voting support than incumbent 
directors or those who join the board during nonsettlement campaigns), with Coffee, supra
note 211, at 15 (noting that the Bebchuk study cannot be considered exhaustive because it 
covers results only through 2011, while the Big Three began voicing their concerns and 
criticisms only more recently in 2015 and 2016, when the number of board seats won 
through settlements further increased). See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 23–24 (describing 
the role of passive investors in relation to active investors).
219. See Lund, supra note 5, at 500; Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 98. 
220.  See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
222.  See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
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[VOL. 55:  803, 2018] Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? 
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of an underperforming company in the name of ESG goals, whether or not 
the activist’s strategy is effectively a long-term one.”223 
Therefore, interaction among hedge funds and passive index funds is an 
area of research that deserves greater attention. Specifically, it is essential 
to carry out additional empirical analysis to test the tendency of hedge 
funds to seek passive investors’ support by adopting more long-term oriented 
strategies and paying increasing attention to ESG issues.224 If further analysis
confirms that interaction with passive index funds could effectively discipline
activist hedge funds, the EU Commission should probably reconsider its 
skeptical approach to hedge fund activism.
B. Eliminating Passive Fund Voting to Activate Other Nonactivist 
Institutional Investors?
Should—as is likely at least over the short term—the EU Commission 
not intend to rely on activist hedge funds and prefer to maintain its
institutional investor-driven strategy, it is necessary to set out measures to
promote more effective and costly engagement with passive index funds.225 
Thus far, a detailed investigation of corporate-governance consequences of
passive investing has proposed restricting passive funds from voting on their
shares.226 This proposal reasons that passive fund managers be treated like 
derivative holders for the purposes of voting because passive funds attract 
investors on the basis of their ability to track an index.227 Therefore, voting 
will increase costs for investors without producing corresponding benefits 
and therefore would arguably breach the fund’s fiduciary duty.228 Moreover,
223. Pacces, supra note 138, at 21. 
224. See supra note 161. 
225. As said above, actively managed mutual funds have limited incentive to actively 
engage with investee companies as well. See supra text accompanying note 9. Therefore, 
the following analysis generally fits not only for passive index funds but for mutual funds 
overall. However, for the sake of simplicity, I will refer below only to passive index funds. 
226. See Lund, supra note 5, at 530–31 (“[V]oting power for ‘non-routine’ matters 
[c]ould flow through to the passive fund’s investors in a phenomenon known as ‘pass-
through voting.’ [Therefore], a rule could provide for pass-through voting on non-routine 
matters, such as a default, allowing investors the option of reassigning the proxy back to 
the fund.” (footnote omitted)). As retail investors participating in mutual funds would be 
unlikely to vote because of collective action problems, such a solution could provide a
benefit similar to that of passive fund voting elimination.
227. Id. at 511. 
228. Id. at 529 (“The rule could employ a presumption that any fund that uses 
indexing as an investment strategy is a passive fund. That presumption could be rebutted,
allowing the passive fund to be ‘certified’ for voting, if the fund showed that its strategy
841










    
  
 
     
  
 









    




     
   
  
 
      
 
      
       
 
    
   
    
 
the elimination of passive fund voting would be beneficial because it 
would “preserve the influence of informed investors by giving each active
investor a proportional increase in voting power.”229 
However, this proposal seems to present some potential drawbacks. 
First, eliminating the influence of passive investors within the governance 
of investee companies seems too radical an approach, which does not
adequately consider available studies concerning corporate governance 
implications of passive investing.230 Second, the available evidence shows
that passive investors may positively affect aspects of corporate governance— 
directors’ independence, board diversity, disclosure of climate risks—that 
require low-cost intervention.231 In addition, were passive investors deprived
of voting rights, this would undermine their potential positive impact on 
strategies of other institutional investors, including hedge funds, inducing
them to pursue long-term oriented approaches and to consider ESG issues.232 
Finally, it appears reasonable to expect that in countries such as continental 
Europe, where activism is still limited, this proposal would have the unintended
consequences of making the shareholder base even more passive and 
weakening shareholders’ oversight role. In fact, a regulatory strategy of 
this type does not affect the costs of engagement and does not incentivize 
managers of actively managed mutual funds to scale up their engagement
activities.233 
incorporated meaningful portfolio company research—including ongoing monitoring and 
fundamental analysis—and that its investment in governance is above a certain threshold 
(based on the fund’s size).”).
229. Id. at 529–30. 
230. See supra Part III. 
231. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra note 179 and accompanying text; see also Jonathan Litt, Why All 
Shareholder Voices, Even Passive Ones, Matter, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://nyti.ms/ 
2ttNiRV [https://perma.cc/GXV6-LMAQ] (“[P]assive funds will increasingly be willing 
to engage with active investors. This dialogue will help passive investors better use the 
knowledge and experience fundamental investors can bring through their years of
engagement with these companies and the individuals that run them.”).
233. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Are Active Mutual Funds More Active Owners 
than Index Funds?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/03/are-active-mutual-funds-more-active-owners-
than-index-funds/ [https://perma.cc/SP4F-BLLU] (“[W]hile we recognize the current 
shortcomings of index fund stewardship, we caution against any approach that gives up on
such stewardship and proposes to curtail the influence of index funds in favor of increased
influence of actively managed funds.”). 
842
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C. Shifting Passive Funds’ Engagement Costs to Ultimate  
Investors or Investee Companies 
Given the elimination of passive fund voting seems unlikely to trigger 
more effective engagement by other nonactivist institutional investors,234 
other policy options aimed at stimulating passive investor involvement in 
the corporate governance of investee companies will be considered. 
Because a reduction in engagement costs is the key incentive for passive 
investors to play a more active corporate governance role, there is no doubt
that any regulatory intervention that solely seeks to extend the investment
timeframe, such as those introduced in France235 and Italy236 concerning 
tenure voting and loyalty dividends, will not alter the conduct of passive 
index fund managers.237  Because passive investors as permanent shareholderscannot sell shares included in the reference index, they commit to the long
term—irrespective of the level of their voting rights—and may forego
loyalty benefits simply because of portfolio rebalancing.238  Consequently, it
is not surprising that passive funds’ managers adhere to the “one share –
one vote – one dividend” principle and are generally against the introduction
of loyalty-shares or loyalty-dividends.239 
Therefore, policy interventions that are aimed at reducing the costs of 
engagement are key to incentivizing passive index funds to play a more
234. Id. (“[I]t is important to recognize that there is evidence that many active funds 
are, to varying extents, ‘closet indexers’ whose holdings substantially overlap with their 
benchmark index, deviating only by limited underweighting and overweighting of certain
stocks.”). 
235. See Loi 2014-384 du 29 mars 2014 visant à reconquérir l’économie réelle [Law 
2014-384 of March 29, 2014 Aiming to Reclaim the Real Economy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL 
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 27, 2014, art. 7. 
236. For loyalty dividends and loyalty shares, see Article 127-quarter and Article
127-quinqueies of Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n.58, in G.U. Mar. 26, 1998, n.71 
(It.) For an overview of national provisions concerning loyalty shares, see Hopt, supra
note 19, at 174; Ventoruzzo, supra note 23, at 5–9, 13–16. 
237. See Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-
Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 627–28 (2016) (finding no evidence that time
phased voting increased shareholdings by institutional investors with long-term 
investment horizons or decreased shareholdings by institutional investors with short-term 
investment horizons); see also Alex Edmans, The Answer to Short-Termism Isn’t Asking 
Investors to Be Patient, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 18, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/07/the-
answer-to-short-termism-isnt-asking-investors-to-be-patient [https://perma.cc/QEN8-XT3Z].
238. See Pacces, supra note 136, at 199, 214. 
239. BLACKROCK, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN
AND AFRICAN SECURITIES 21 (2018), https://www.BlackRock.com/corporate/literature/fact- 
sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-emea.pdf [https://perma.cc/73EN-8FTC]. 
843
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effective stewardship role in investee companies. To this end, one initial
regulatory approach could be to allow institutional investors to transfer
engagement costs—even if only expenses related to very costly engagements 
—to ultimate investors or to investee companies.
Institutional investors can already—within the limits of the law—charge
engagement costs to their investment funds, thereby passing these costs
on to the funds’ beneficial investors.240 Although some investors who are
sensitive to corporate governance issues may accept an increase in fees
associated with stewardship costs,241 this solution features significant 
drawbacks. First, it may increase costs for ultimate investors.242  Second,
it could favor the exploitation of engagement initiatives by institutional 
investors.243 Third, such a solution would not resolve the collective action 
problems affecting the investment industry: it would lead to an increase
in the fee for the engagement fund while not significantly improving its
performance compared to other funds holding the same company in their
portfolio, thereby resulting in a loss of clients to competitors.244 
Alternatively, to incentivize institutional investors to exercise more effective 
oversight over the management of investee companies, the engagement-
related costs borne by institutional investors could be charged to the
company, provided that the shareholder intervention is beneficial.245 
More specifically, “the benefit for the company could be demonstrated by
a sustained (at least a year) boost in stock price following the intervention 
[and the shareholder could] receive costs associated with that intervention, 
limited to research costs incurred no more than one month prior to  the  
intervention.”246 However, this policy option raises questions. First, because
it would enable shareholders to recover only part of the costs associated 
with their interventions, it is questionable whether this solution could 
effectively incentivize passive index funds to make more costly engagements.247 
Second, it would be difficult to determine the benefits for the company
because any increase in the stock price over the period following the 
institutional investor intervention may not necessarily correlate with it.248 
240. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 108. 
241. Lund, supra note 5, at 531. 
242. ROGER. M BARKER & IRIS H.-Y. CHIU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT 177 (2017). 
243. Id. at 178. 
244. See id. at 288; Bebchuk et al., supra note 3, at 99. 
245. See Lund, supra note 5, at 534–35. 
246. Id. at 535. 
247. Id.
248. Id. (noting that, because it is difficult to quantify the benefit resulting from the
shareholder’s intervention, it is hard to design an incentives’ regime providing the activist
shareholder with a benefit-related monetary reward).
844
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Therefore, this solution could result in the company being charged with 
costs of engagements that do not have any positive effects or that are even
harmful. 
D. Redistributing Engagement Costs by Favoring Institutional 
Investor Coordination 
The above suggests there are no solutions capable of significantly
reducing the engagement costs borne by passive funds—and by nonactivist
institutional investors in general. Furthermore, a partial reduction in costs 
may not be sufficient because collective action problems lead passive
index funds to refrain from engaging with investee companies.249  Thus, a
different approach must be preferred. Instead of attempting to reduce the
costs of engagement, it is preferable to promote the redistribution of these 
costs between active and passive institutional investors. In this regard, 
incentivizing collective engagement could be key.250  This means engagement
costs would be shared between the institutional investors that collectively 
undertake engagement activities, thereby overcoming possible action
problems.251 
This proposal does not seek to radically change the engagement practices
of passive investors. These investors would continue to adopt standardized 
voting policies and to rely largely on proxy advisory services for routine 
matters.252 On the other hand, the redistribution of costs favored by collective
engagement may promote more proactive engagement by them in non-
routine issues, such as proxy contests or M&A and related-party transactions 
—if they experience the redistribution of costs effected by collective 
engagement.253 Additionally, collective engagement can incentivize passive
and active institutional investors to adequately scrutinize activists’ proposals.
In this way, interaction between activist and nonactivist investors can render
more effective shareholder engagement. 
249. Id. at 500. 
250. See Birkmose, supra note 174, at 243; Ruth Sullivan, Collective Engagement is 
Picking up Steam, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/0231ac18-cb07-
11de-97e0-00144feabdc0.
251. See OECD, THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING GOOD
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 38 (2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081553.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9RZD-9377] (“The ability for institutional investors to co-operate is fundamental to 
resolving the free rider problems . . . .”). 
252. See Enriques & Romano, supra note 75, at 15. 
253. See OECD, supra note 251, at 13, 38.
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The collective engagement of institutional investors can be organized 
in different ways, and some proposals have already been made in this area.
For example, Sharon Hannes sets out a model of collective engagement 
based on a contractual arrangement among a broad group of institutional 
investors and a task force of financial experts called “super hedge fund.”254 
Such an agreement would have a two-fold advantage. First, it would make
it possible to resolve collective action problems and conflicts of interest
that restrain institutional investors from engagement by splitting engagement
costs among investors adhering to the arrangement.255 Second, it would
counter the claims of short-termism raised against current hedge fund
activism.256 According to this proposal, “an existing well-connected 
organization, such as ISS or the Council of Institutional Investors, or 
alternatively, a not-for-profit organization [established specifically] for 
this purpose,” would draft the agreement and serve as a clearing house for 
the operation.257 The team of experts brought together by the parent
organization would have significant powers and would be free to act on 
its own initiative. Specifically, “[t]he task force would be relatively free 
to identify the target and design an activism strategy; it would also be able
to initiate and manage activist campaigns against the target company.”258 
Furthermore, to allow institutional investors to effectively monitor the 
task force’s activities, the agreement could stipulate any measures requiring 
pre-approval by the member institutions with a stake in the target 
company.259 
254. Hannes, supra note 212, at 163, 182–89. 
255. Id. at 182–83 (“The standard agreement would provide crucial two-tier funding
for the task force’s activities. Tier-one funding would be quite minimal and used to
support the task force before it engages in activism. . . . However, once the task force
begins to zero in on a target, it would become entitled to call for additional and much more 
substantial tier-two funding. This capital call should be sufficient to cover major possible 
expenses such as proxy fight costs, litigation, and public and investors relations campaigns. 
Most importantly, the source of funding for the two tiers would differ as follows: the low-
tier-one funding would be provided by all institutional investors that have signed an
agreement with the task force. [By contrast,] funding called for after the task force has
zeroed in on a target would not come from all the institutional investors.  Rather, the tier-
two funding would be borne solely by the institutional investors that invest in the specific 
potential corporate target and pro-rata to their holdings in the target.” (footnotes omitted)).
256. See id. at 189–99. 
257. Id. at 199 (footnote omitted).
258. Id. at 184 (“[T]he task force could use a variety of different tactics, fueled by 
the funding from its members, such as public relation campaigns and litigation against
management. The task force could also initiate a proxy fight in which it would have
an advisory role (but would not be given a proxy to engage in any action that requires 
the vote of the institutional investors).”).
259. Id. at 185. 
846
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The United Kingdom has already adopted a similar approach. Based on
the recommendations set forth by the UK equity markets review, undertaken 
by Professor John Kay and promoted by the UK Government,260 an  
Investor Forum was established in 2014 with the aim of promoting the 
collective engagement of institutional investors.261 Currently, the Investor
Forum operates as a member-founded nonprofit organization and has its
own team of corporate governance and financial experts.262 At present, 
there are forty-two institutional investors in the Investor Forum, of which 
fourteen are international, accounting for around 29% of FTSE All 
Share market capitalization.263  Between 2015 and 2017, the Forum assessed
twenty-eight collective engagement initiatives and engaged with eighteen.264 
The range of participants in collective engagement initiatives is between 
two and fifteen, representing company market capitalization of between
7% and 50%.265 
In line with the recommendations of the Kay Review, the Investor Forum 
takes a more flexible approach compared to that set out in the Hannes 
proposal.266  The collective engagement framework elaborated by the Investor 
Forum states, among other things, that “[m]embers retain full voting and
other investment rights in respect of their shareholdings” and are free to
“choose[] to participate in an [e]ngagement involving a [c]ompany in which 
[they are shareholders or] to opt out of an [e]ngagement at any time.”267 
Additionally, Forum members are “encouraged to . . . continue their direct
interaction with [c]ompanies” falling beyond the purview of the Forum.268 
260. See JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM
DECISION MAKING 51–53 (2012), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-
markets-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AJG-3U4D]. 
261. BARKER & CHIU, supra note 242, at 175. 
262. See generally  INV’R FORUM, REVIEW 2017 (2018), http://www.investorforum.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Annual-review-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV88-X8TZ].
263. Membership Summary, INV. F. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.investorforum. 
org.uk/membership-summary/ [https://perma.cc/C6T7-VH52].
264. INV’R FORUM, supra note 262, at 2.
265. Id. at 5.
266. See KAY, supra note 260, at 51 (“Rather than a formal, static body, we anticipate
that the membership and format of the forum would be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
both general discussion of issues of company strategy and corporate governance, and also 
specific issues arising at particular companies.”).


























        
 
         
   
  






   
  
   
 
 
   
According to this flexible approach, both affiliated institutional investors 
and listed companies in which investors hold a stake can propose initiating
an engagement.269 The Forum’s team then evaluates the proposal and,
once it has determined that the proposal is consistent with the Forum’s 
engagement framework, the team engages in consultation with the major
shareholders of the company to determine the level of member support 
for the proposed engagement.270 The Investor Forum proceeds with the
engagement if, and only if, the proposal reaches an adequate level of support.271 
Although the UK approach to collective engagement seems capable of
favoring more effective and proactive institutional investor engagement,272 it 
is unclear whether institutional investors will be willing to pay fees to
become members of the Investor Forum or another similar institution. In fact, 
institutional investors and especially passive index funds might prefer free-
riding on the initiatives of other investors. 
However, although the benefits of collective engagement for passive
investors are more limited because of the presence of internal stewardship 
teams as well as the fact that each portfolio company has a lower relative
weight, anecdotal evidence and academic analysis suggests that collective 
engagement can also incentivize passive index fund managers to engage 
in costlier engagement activities.  For example, as one of the members of
the Investor Forum, BlackRock participates “under the umbrella of the 
Collective Engagement Framework of the Investor Forum . . . in collaborative 
engagements with other shareholders where concerns have been identified 
by a number of investors.”273 More generally, as observed by Luca Enriques
and Alessandro Romano, network theory could explain the participation of 
institutional investors in collective engagement initiatives.274 In particular,
they argue that “if the potential gains from cooperating are large enough, 
the relevant players might decide to invest resources in the creation of a
public monitoring institution that increases the chances that those patterns
of cooperative behavior are sustained across time.”275 Additionally, as the
costs of setting up a monitoring institution borne by each institutional
investor are likely to be minuscule compared to the value of its portfolio, 
“if cooperation . . . increases the value of the portfolio assets, however 
marginally, the benefits derived from cooperation would most likely
269. See id. at 5. 
270. Id. 
271. See id.
272.  See BARKER & CHIU, supra note 242, at 173. 
 273.  BLACKROCK, supra note 239, at 2; see also Sullivan, supra note 250. 
274.  Enriques & Romano, supra note 75, at 35. 
275. Id.
848
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outweigh the costs borne by each investor to establish the monitoring 
institution.”276 
Nevertheless, the dissemination of collective engagement initiatives 
like those promoted by the Investor Forum still appears limited in the EU,
which could be because of the legal concerns raised by coordination between 
institutional investors.277 In particular, institutional investors who engage
collectively could be regarded as parties “acting in concert,” with the result
that collective engagement could trigger the mandatory bid threshold.278 
There is also a risk that collective engagement could entail the exchange
of inside information between the company and the institutional investors
involved in the engagement or among the latter.279 
Concerning concerted action, in response to the concerns raised by the
Commission’s 2011 Green Paper,280 the ESMA identified a “White List”
of certain activities in which shareholders might wish to engage for the 
purpose of exercising good corporate governance without seeking to acquire
or exercise control over the company.281 Therefore, when shareholders
engage in any activity included on the White List, their cooperation should 
not be considered concerted action, and shareholders would not risk 
triggering the mandatory bid threshold.282  However, the ESMA provides
investors with only limited protection,283 for it also states that “national 
competent authorities, when determining whether cooperating shareholders 
are acting in concert, decide each case on the basis of its own particular 
facts.”284 
276. Id. at 36; see also Hannes, supra note 212, at 183. 
277. See McCahery et al., supra note 82, at 2920–22; see also OECD, supra note 
251, at 39; Birkmose, supra note 174, at 244. 
278. BARKER & CHIU, supra note 242, at 174. 
279. See Giovanni Strampelli, Knocking at the Boardroom Door: A Transatlantic 
Overview of Director-Institutional Investor Engagement in Law and Practice, 12 VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 187, 211–12 (2018). 
280. See EC Green Paper, supra note 171, at 14. 
281. EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., PUBLIC STATEMENT: INFORMATION ON SHAREHOLDER
COOPERATION AND ACTING IN CONCERT UNDER THE TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE – 1ST
UPDATE 2 (2014), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-
677.pdf [https://perma.cc/L66Z-CYHQ].
282. See id.
283. See Birkmose, supra note 174, at 244. 
284. EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 281, at 4 (“[W]here shareholders 
engaging in an activity on the White List are in fact cooperating with the aim of acquiring
or exercising control over the company, or, in fact, have acquired or are exercising control, 
those shareholders will be regarded as persons acting in concert and may have to make a
mandatory bid.”).
849
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Similarly, the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) deals with potential
contrasts between shareholder engagement and the market abuse regime
by observing that it “is not intended to prohibit discussions of a general 
nature regarding the business and market developments between shareholders 
and management concerning an issuer [because such] relationships are
essential for the efficient functioning of markets and should not be 
prohibited.”285 However, the Market Abuse Regulation does not provide
an exemption for collective engagement or more detailed guidance on
how to conduct engagement to avoid MAR infringements.286 
Consequently, although the indications provided by European lawmakers
and the ESMA could theoretically favor collective engagement by institutional 
investors, concerns remain because the current regulatory framework does 
not design an effective safe harbor for shareholder engagement.287 Therefore,
should European lawmakers, regulators, and corporate governance experts 
consider that collective engagement can promote more effective involvement
by active and passive institutional investors in the corporate governance 
of investee companies, a practical framework aimed at reducing collective
engagement-related risks of violating disclosure and takeover rules and at 
favoring board-shareholder engagement should be developed.
In line with the objective, EU lawmakers—or the ESMA—could 
provide more detailed guidelines concerning concerted action by stating 
that collective engagement will not amount to concerted action where the
institutional investors involved have signed a commitment not to form a
concerted party or group seeking to obtain the control of the company that
could trigger the mandatory bid threshold. Instead, lawmakers could
encourage the appointment of a third party to monitor compliance with
the agreement. Such a precaution is included in the Collective Engagement
Framework of the Investor Forum, which provides that engagements are
to be monitored by the Forum and involved institutional investors can be
asked to leave or, if necessary, expelled from an engagement if their
behavior compromises the collective initiatives.288  Along the same lines,
to limit the threat of concerted action, stewardship codes could explicitly
state that participating institutional investors who adhere to a collective 
engagement must refrain from any initiative aimed at seeking control of
the relevant company.
285. Regulation 596/2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and Repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 1, 4. 
286. See generally id.
287. See Birkmose, supra note 174, at 233–49, 252. 
288. INV’R FORUM, supra note 267, at 4.
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Likewise, to further promote collective engagements, EU lawmakers or
the ESMA could provide more detailed guidance concerning topics that
are more suitable for discussion or procedures that should be implemented
to avoid infringements of market abuse rules within collective engagements.289 
In designing such guidelines, the relevance of coordinating institutions 
such as the Investor Forum could be expressly recognized by admitting 
that they can help institutional investors to implement procedures aimed
at preventing the abuse of inside information.290 Furthermore, corporate 
governance and stewardship codes should provide more detailed guidance 
concerning collective engagement by indicating how to avoid information 
leaks. In fact, until now, soft law guidance concerning collective engagement
is, with some exceptions, quite generic and does not actually tackle the
legal and practical problems posed by collective engagement.291 
Neither regulatory approach would establish an absolute safe harbor.
Judges and supervisory authorities might still take action against issuers
and institutional investors based on alleged breaches of the takeover or 
market abuse legal framework. However, this could help promote collective
engagement by providing institutional investors with more detailed guidelines 
and limiting the compliance costs associated with collective engagement. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Leading passive fund managers, such as the Big Three, which hold 
significant stakes in a large number of listed companies, perform an 
increasingly important corporate governance role and can also influence
the conduct of activist shareholders. Although the Big Three vote at almost
all shareholder meetings of investee companies and have made a significant
289. Strampelli, supra note 279, at 240. 
290. For the Collective Engagement Framework developed by the Investor Forum,
see, for example, INV’R FORUM, supra note 267, at 3–4 (stating the Forum actively seeks
to avoid the circulation of inside information and prevents institutional investors from 
participating in engagements and forming concert parties that would trigger the mandatory
bid threshold). 
291. See, e.g., EUROPEAN FUND & ASSET MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 24, at 7 (“[W]hen
participating in collective engagement [investors] should have due regard to market 
regulations and their own policies on conflicts of interest and insider information.”); FIN.
REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 9 (2012), https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
7AXS-2UR6] (“Institutional investors should disclose their policy on collective engagement . . . . 
The disclosure should . . . indicate the kinds of circumstances in which the institutional 
investor would consider participating in collective engagement.”).
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number of engagements, it is still doubtful whether passive investors are
indeed active owners because they have limited incentives to invest in
stewardship. Anecdotal and empirical evidence provides limited conclusions
but suggests passive investors tend to adopt a low-cost investment strategy
to reduce costs associated with engagement with investee companies,
thereby keeping their fees low. Therefore, because passive investors are
focused on the long-term, the rise of passive investing provides confirmation 
that the main disincentive for engagement by passive and active institutional 
investors is not short-termism but cost. 
Against this background, taking the current EU corporate governance 
framework as a reference, this Article has shown the limits to a regulatory 
approach to institutional shareholder engagement that mainly focuses on
short-termism and argues that, to promote more effective institutional investor 
engagement, lawmakers, regulators, and corporate governance professionals
should tackle cost-related issues more effectively. Moreover, the article 
has outlined a conceptual framework for possible regulatory strategies aimed
at reducing the engagement-related costs that lawmakers could adopt to
incentivize passive index funds managers and, more generally, nonactivist
institutional investors to perform a more effective oversight role over 
investee companies. 
852
